1	STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE				
2	PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION				
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4	November 16, 2012 - 10:18 a.m. Concord, New Hampshire				
5	NHPUC NOV26'12 PM 3:06				
6					
7	RE: DT 12-308 COMCAST PHONE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, LLC, AND COMCAST IP PHONE II, LLC:				
8	AND COMCAST IP PHONE II, LLC: Application of Senate Bill 48 on VoIP and IP-Enabled Services.				
9	and it maded box (1000).				
10	PRESENT: Chairman Amy L. Ignatius, Presiding Commissioner Robert R. Scott				
11	Commissioner Robert R. Scott Commissioner Michael D. Harrington				
12	Sandy Deno, Clerk				
13					
14	APPEARANCES: Reptg. Comcast Phone of New Hampshire, LLC and Comcast IP Phone II, LLC:				
15	Luke C. Platzer, Esq. (Jenner & Block) Susan S. Geiger, Esq. (Orr & Reno)				
16	Stacey Parker, Esq. (Comcast)				
17	Reptg. Verizon:				
18	Alexander W. Moore, Esq.				
19	Reptg. the Rural Local Exchange Carriers: Harry N. Malone, Esq. (Devine Millimet)				
20	Reptg. Northern New England Telephone				
21	Operations d/b/a FairPoint Communications: Patrick C. McHugh, Esq.				
22	*				
23	Court Reporter: Steven E. Patnaude, LCR No. 52				
24					

1					
2	APPEARANCES:	(Continued)			
3		Reptg. Residential Ratepayers:			
4		Susan W. Chamberlin, Esq., Consumer Advocate Office of Consumer Advocate			
5		Reptg. PUC Staff: David Shulock, Esq., Esq.			
6		Edward N. Damon, Esq. Kate Bailey, Director/Telecom Division			
7		Les Stachow, Telecom Division			
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PROCEEDING

CHAIRMAN IGNATIUS: I'd like to open the hearing in Docket DT 12-308. This is Comcast Phone of New Hampshire and Comcast Phone II, LLC. It grows out of a proceeding at the Commission that was then appealed to the New Hampshire Supreme Court. And, on October 12th, 2012, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the New Hampshire Commission for the limited purpose of reconsidering Commission Orders 25,262 and 25,274, and related orders in Docket DT 09-044.

We issued an order of notice on October 24th, 2012, explaining the situation and asking for any parties to that underlying case, or other interested people who weren't part of that case, but were concerned about the issues, give them an opportunity for filing briefs on the issues raised by the Court. And, because the Court was on a very tight schedule, our order of notice also followed a very tight schedule. So, we scheduled a briefing deadline for November 9th and oral argument this morning, November 16th, at 10:00. And, so, that's where we are today.

Let's begin with appearances, and then
I'll talk about the game plan for how we're going to work
our way through this.

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1
                         MR. PLATZER: Thank you. It's Luke
 2
       Platzer, appearing on behalf of Comcast. And, with me at
 3
       counsels' table are Susan Geiger and Stacey Parker.
 4
                         CHAIRMAN IGNATIUS:
                                             Good morning.
 5
                         MS. PARKER: Good morning.
 6
                         MR. MOORE: Alex Moore, for Verizon.
 7
       With me is Lisa Thorne, our Director of State Regulatory.
 8
                         CHAIRMAN IGNATIUS: Good morning.
 9
                         MR. MALONE:
                                      Good morning.
10
      Malone, with Devine Millimet, representing the Rural
11
       Carriers. And, with me is Bill Stafford, at Granite State
12
                  I'd like to take care of one little bit of
       Telephone.
13
       housekeeping, if I may. The Footnote Number 1 of our
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      brief listed the members of the Rural Carrier Association.
15
      And, because of an eccentricity in Microsoft Word, which
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       wouldn't have happened with WordPerfect -- don't get me
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       started -- only the first line of the footnote appeared.
      And, so, we're missing the names of a number of the
18
19
       companies. And, for the record, I would like to read them
20
      off, if I could?
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                         CHAIRMAN IGNATIUS:
                                             Please do.
22
                         MR. MALONE: Footnote 1 should have
23
      read: "Bretton Woods Telephone Company, Incorporated;
24
      Dixville Telephone Company; Dunbarton Telephone Company,
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1
       Incorporated; Granite State Telephone, Incorporated;
 2
       Hollis Telephone Company, Incorporated; Kearsarge
 3
       Telephone Company; Merrimack County Telephone Company; and
 4
       Wilton Telephone Company." Thank you.
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                         CHAIRMAN IGNATIUS: Thank you. We were
       trying to guess at why some were in and some were out, and
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 7
       it led to some intriguing questions, but not very good
 8
       answers, and certainly not that the Microsoft product
 9
       didn't allow for it.
10
                         All right. Next, who do we have?
11
      Mr. McHugh.
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                         MR. McHUGH: Good morning. Pat McHugh,
       appearing on behalf of Northern New England Telephone
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14
      Operations, LLC. Thank you.
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                         CHAIRMAN IGNATIUS: Good morning.
16
                         MS. CHAMBERLIN: Susan Chamberlin,
      Consumer Advocate, on behalf of the residential
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18
      ratepayers.
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                         CHAIRMAN IGNATIUS: Good morning.
20
                         MR. SHULOCK: Good morning.
21
      Shulock, on behalf of Staff. And, with me at the table is
22
      the Director of the Legal Division, Ed Damon, and members
23
      of the Telecommunications Staff.
24
                         CHAIRMAN IGNATIUS: Good morning, and
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welcome, everyone. The order of proceedings will be to allow each party a ten-minute period to present oral argument. You don't need to take the ten minutes, if you don't feel you need, you won't be penalized for that. But we want to give people an opportunity to make their arguments and respond to arguments made by others in their briefs, if you wish. And, then, as we go around, we'll have questions from the Bench and from our General Counsel, Anne Ross. We then will move to the next party and continue on.

At the end of it, it may be that we go back around for further questions to some others, but that may not be necessary. We do not plan on questions from each other. This is really a "questions from the Bench" on these issues.

At the close of it, I think we'll probably take a break, recess for a moment, for us to just reconnoiter among ourselves and be sure that we covered all the things that we wanted to, to see if there are any further questions we meant to get back to. And, if there are, we'll come back and conclude. If not, we can adjourn at that point.

And, I understand an order of proceedings was circulated yesterday or the day before,

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       that would be the Comcast entities; followed by ATT and
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       Verizon, working as -- as they filed the joint brief; then
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       the New Hampshire Telephone Association members, the
 4
       RLECs; then OCA; then FairPoint; and, finally, if anyone
 5
       here from New Hampshire Legal Assistance arrives, an
       opportunity for them to speak, but I don't see anyone here
 6
 7
       at present.
 8
                         And, that was conveyed to everyone,
 9
       correct? That's an order that people are aware of?
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                         (No verbal response)
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                         CHAIRMAN IGNATIUS: All right.
                                                         Then, is
12
       there anything else? Any procedural matter to take up
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       before we begin or should we begin with Comcast?
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       Ms. Geiger.
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                         MS. GEIGER: Yes.
                                            Just want to note for
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       the record that, as ordered, Comcast filed an affidavit of
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       publication on November 2nd.
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                         CHAIRMAN IGNATIUS:
                                             Thank you very much.
19
       Appreciate that.
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                         MR. MALONE:
                                      Madam Chairman, just a
       question for clarification. The ten minutes, will that
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22
       include questioning from the Bench? Or, will questionings
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       from the Bench be after the ten minutes?
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                         CHAIRMAN IGNATIUS: They will be in
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1
       addition to. So, you'll have your --
 2
                         MR. MALONE:
                                      Thank you.
 3
                         CHAIRMAN IGNATIUS: -- your full ten
       minutes, if we let you. No, this won't be trial by fire.
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       Although, I have to say, there's been certain arguments at
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       the Supreme Court where I had so little to say I welcomed
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       questions, because I didn't have much of an argument.
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                         All right. Why don't we begin then with
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       Comcast. And, Mr. Platzer, are you doing that?
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                         MR. PLATZER:
                                       Yes.
11
                         CHAIRMAN IGNATIUS:
                                             Thank you.
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                         MR. PLATZER:
                                       Thank you.
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                         CHAIRMAN IGNATIUS:
                                             If you're
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       comfortable there, or at the center, it's your choice.
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                         MR. PLATZER: Oh, we want to thank the
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       Commission for the opportunity to present our comments
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       here today. We think that the order of notice sort of
       asked the right questions coming out of the Supreme
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       Court's remand, which we tried our best to address in our
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      briefs, and would like to summarize here. But, of course,
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       happy to answer questions as they come up.
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                         And, what we see as the critical
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       question here now on remand is whether there's still any
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       live controversy involving the regulation of Comcast
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service that actually requires resolution of the questions that the Commission asked when it opened the DT 09-044 docket. And, we believe that the questions that the Commission had to address at the time have now been answered rather clearly by the Legislature in Senate Bill 48, and that there is no longer a live controversy here. And, as a result, not only as a matter of law, but simply as a matter of prudence, that the orders in 09-044 need to be vacated.

We think that Senate Bill 48 is quite clear in laying out what the regulatory obligations of VoIP providers in the state are. The Bill has very broad language, including a regulation that doesn't fall in the specific exceptions, the savings clauses in the statute. And, we think it's clear that the Legislature was trying to hit sort of everything as precluded, unless it was specifically exempted in the statute. And, because not only did they -- the Senate Bill 48 bar direct regulation, it also has very broad language that bars any regulation that would even have the effect of regulating the various different items listed in the statute, terms, conditions of service, market entry, market exit. And, the legislative history is clear on that as well. And that, while it certainly doesn't mean that the Commission no

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longer has any regulatory authority over VoIP providers, we think that the question that the Commission was trying to answer when it opened the 09-044 docket, which was precisely "what authority does the Commission have?" The Legislature has now given rather precise answers to that. It listed specific statutes and specific general categories of statutes that now fall within the Commission's jurisdiction.

So, now that the Legislature has clearly answered that question, we think that the controversy that may have existed at the time the docket was opened no longer exists, and therefore makes this case moot. And, what we've tried to do in our brief is show how all of the different statutes and regulations that still apply to VoIP providers in the state are ones where the Commission no longer needs to determine whether or not fixed VoIP providers are public utilities in order to exercise that jurisdiction. We showed a lot of those -- a lot of the statutes that are called out in the savings clause don't depend on whether or not an entity is a public utility or not, they apply independent criteria that vary from statute to statute. So, whether or not something is a public utility doesn't matter anymore to the application of the Commission's jurisdiction.

And, in the few cases where a "public utility" designation remains relevant to whether or not a particular statute or regulation applies, those regulations either have no application to fixed VoIP providers, such as Comcast, for instance, ones that deal with ILEC obligations. And, the remainder all apply anyway, because they apply to Comcast Phone of New Hampshire, the CLEC, well, I guess now it's the ELEC, subject to those regulations. Things like Dig Safe and number porting or slamming, are all regulations that certainly apply to Comcast, but they apply through the CLEC. So, there's no controverse -- no conceivable controversy as to whether or not they would apply to a VoIP provider, because they apply anyway.

CHAIRMAN IGNATIUS: Can I ask you, are you stating that the provider is a public utility, but the things that flow from that are not important? Or, that you're not a public utility, and, therefore, the things that flow from that aren't required?

MR. PLATZER: So, we certainly concede that the ELEC, Comcast Phone of New Hampshire, not the VoIP provider, but the ELEC is a public utility. And, we've never contested that the Commission has jurisdiction authority to regulate the ELEC as a public utility. And,

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what we are saying is that the question of whether or not the VoIP provider, Comcast IP Phone, whether that is also a public utility, no longer has any legal effect or significance after Senate Bill 48, because --

CHAIRMAN IGNATIUS: But my question was, is it a public utility, the VoIP provider?

MR. PLATZER: Well, we believe that it's not, for the reasons that we sort of were preparing to appeal to the New Hampshire Supreme Court. But we don't believe that the Commission needs to resolve that question anymore, in light of Senate Bill 48. Because, and, certainly, at the time that the orders in 09-044 were issued, and at the time we appealed those orders, that designation of the "VoIP provider" as a "public utility" carried substantially -- carried a lot of legal significance with it. And, it's our contention that it no longer has that legal significance. Because the few statutes and regulations that are preserved by SB 48's savings clause that still apply on the basis of whether or not something is a public utility, as opposed to being generally applicable or applying to cable providers, etcetera, those few regulations, none of them really have any relevance to the VoIP provider anymore, because they deal with things like number porting, like facilities

management, like herbicide use, all of which are regulations that apply to the ELEC or -- and/or to the local cable affiliate.

So, I guess that what I'm trying to express is there is no additional regulations that would fall on Comcast, if the VoIP provider is a public utility, that don't already fall on Comcast through the ELEC and through the cable affiliate. So, while we certainly still believe that the VoIP provider is not a public utility, and would appeal that — the resolution of that statutory question to the Court, if it goes back up, we think that that question has now become academic, as a practical matter, which is why we think that this case is now moot.

CHAIRMAN IGNATIUS: And, if, for some reason, either because of change in business models or, I don't know, some regulatory action, the regulated ELEC was no longer in operation in New Hampshire, what would that mean for the things that you say "well, don't worry, they're getting picked up through the ELEC's obligations?

MR. PLATZER: If that, sort of if that scenario were to come to pass, the Commission might then, at that point, have a live controversy before it, that might require it to take up the question of the designation, the categorization of the VoIP provider. But

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we believe that, and I think there's law out there, we cited it in our Supreme Court briefing, and Verizon also cited it in its brief as well, that you need more than the speculative possibility that some legal question might become relevant at some point in the future for a case not to be moot. It needs to -- there needs to actually be a live controversy now. And, with the way that things stand right now, everything is being picked up through the cable affiliates and the ELEC. And, certainly, we're not asking here, in the context of this remand, for the Commission to hold that our VoIP provider is not a public utility and to reverse the determination from 09-044. That is the relief we would be forced to ask the Supreme Court for. But, if the Commission decides that this question is moot, I think that that issue just goes away, and is open -- and is still there for the Commission to pick up, if, at some point in the future, if some controversy were to arise. And, as a matter of prudence, we think that's also the better course. Because, if this were to ever become relevant in the future, which we don't think

And, as a matter of prudence, we think that's also the better course. Because, if this were to ever become relevant in the future, which we don't think is likely, there would then be a live issue that the Commission could decide, and then Comcast, if necessary, could then take up on appeal. Because, otherwise, if that "public utility" designation for the VoIP provider lives

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       on, but doesn't actually have any practical significance
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       here, we're put in this weird situation where we have to
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       appeal the order to the Supreme Court, and they have to
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       decide this in the context of a moot case. And, for the
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       reasons we stated in our Supreme Court briefing, that's
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       not the way mootness works. You're supposed to, you know,
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       to wait until there's actually a live controversy.
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                         And, actually, I realize, as a
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       housekeeping matter, I realize that, because this is
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       technically a new docket, I think that our briefing on the
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       motion to vacate at the Supreme Court is actually not
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       technically in this docket. And, we would ask the
       Commission to take notice of the briefs that we filed at
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14
       the Supreme Court, which were also filed in 09-044.
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                         CHAIRMAN IGNATIUS: Commissioner
16
       Harrington.
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                         CMSR. HARRINGTON:
                                            Excuse me, but a
       quick follow-up, just so I make sure I understood part of
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       what you said. You're not asking the Commission to
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       reverse the position that the VoIP provider is a public
21
       utility at this time?
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                         MR. PLATZER:
                                       No.
                                            We're merely asking
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       for that conclusion to be vacated.
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                         CMSR. HARRINGTON:
                                            Okay.
                                                   Thank you.
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MR. PLATZER: In other words, we're not asking for a precedential decision on the merits that the VoIP provider is not a public utility. Certainly, we asked the Commission to make that decision, and initially we lost at the Commission. But, if we have to appeal this to the Supreme Court, we will raise that argument there. But we don't believe it's necessary for the Commission to decide on the merits that we're not a public utility, all that we're asking for is that that decision be vacated.

Although, and, obviously, and sort of the elephant in the room here is all of the federal law determinations that the Commission made in the previous orders, because independent of this public utility question, the orders here contain rather extensive holdings on what the federal classification of what our VoIP provider services are, whether they are information services or telecommunications services under federal law. And, we don't think there could be any question that that determination has now become purely academic in light of SB 48. Because the types of state public utility regulations that we were arguing would be preempted under federal law, no longer -- have now been legislatively removed by SB 48. But, it's, unfortunately, those federal determinations are also what would compel further

appellate litigation in this case if the orders aren't vacated.

So, we'd certainly ask that, at a bare minimum, if the Commission is not inclined to vacate the state law determination that our VoIP provider is a public utility, even though we believe that should be vacated, that the Commission, at a bare minimum, vacate the parts of the orders that address the federal classification of the VoIP service. Because we don't think there can be any dispute that federal determination has now been mooted by the legislative removal of the state public utility regulations that would have attached to Comcast VoIP service under the legal regime at the time.

And, I do want to briefly address the -there have been some arguments made mainly by the rural
carriers about what regulations would still apply if
Comcast's VoIP provider is, in fact, a public utility.
And, we really believe that the examples that they have
given don't support the continuation of that "public
utility" holding, because they don't really present any
live controversy.

The first argument we saw from them is that, "well, there are certain fees that the Commission still assesses on public utilities." But, and, certainly,

in Comcast's case, it's one of those cases where those fees are picked up by the ELEC, the regulated entity. The revenues of the VoIP carrier are imputed to the regulated entity. So, there's no -- the amount of fees that Comcast would have to pay to the Commission doesn't turn on whether or not the VoIP provider is a public utility. So, there's no live controversy there.

CHAIRMAN IGNATIUS: Can you repeat that?

Did you just say "the revenues of the VoIP provider are imputed to the ELEC"?

MR. PLATZER: Yes. The Comcast Phone pays the -- pays the fees on behalf of the revenues of the VoIP provider. So, whether or not the VoIP provider has an independent obligation to pay those fees has no real relevance, it wouldn't change anything, in terms of what -- what fees Comcast, as a whole, has to pay to the Commission.

We've also seen the argument that it matters for purposes of the pole attachment rates. We sort of articulated in our briefing why we don't believe there's any difference, under the Commission's regulations, as to whether a provider is a cable company or a local exchange carrier. But, now that there is a -- looks like there's going to be a settlement, pending

Commission approval, of the dispute that the Commission had before it about pole attachment rates, that that issue has now also gone away.

And, then, finally, --

CMSR. HARRINGTON: Excuse me just one second, before you get to the last one, and I'm sorry to interrupt. But, on the previous one, about the assessments to the PUC, you had stated that "the VoIP provider imputes the revenue to the ELEC", and then that's how their revenues are calculated to get the assessment?

MR. PLATZER: Yes.

CMSR. HARRINGTON: Going back to what Chairman Ignatius said earlier, if there was no ELEC in the state for various reasons, I'm assuming then there would be no assessment to the VoIP provider whatsoever?

MR. PLATZER: Well, if there were no -in that sort of speculative example, and, of course, it's
a speculative example that we don't believe could ever
come to pass, because we need the ELEC for interconnection
and number porting and all of those things, so, we don't
think that's a situation that could ever really truly
arise. But, if it were to arise, that would be perhaps a
case in which there might be some live controversy that
then might require the Commission to revisit the question

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       of whether the VoIP provider is a public utility.
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       position is that there is no such question before the
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       Commission now.
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                         CMSR. HARRINGTON: And, you don't see
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       that as a likely occurrence?
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                         MR. PLATZER: We don't see that as a
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       likely occurrence, because there couldn't be -- there
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       couldn't be a VoIP carrier without the CLEC there to
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       provide all the functions it serves.
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                         CMSR. HARRINGTON:
                                            Okay.
                                                    Thank you.
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                         MR. PLATZER: And, then, finally, there
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       is also the argument from the independents that --
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                         CMSR. SCOTT: Sorry to interrupt.
14
       just wanted to follow up while that topic was hot.
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                         MR. PLATZER: Certainly.
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                         CMSR. SCOTT:
                                       So, again, I just want to
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      make sure I understood. So, from your view, if we, since
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       there's no live issue, we were to moot the orders, that
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       they would have no bearing on the future, if we were to
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       make -- to have a docket on the -- whether it's a public
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      utility or not, is that correct?
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                         MR. PLATZER:
                                       Precisely.
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                         CMSR. SCOTT:
                                       Kind of without president?
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                         CMSR. HARRINGTON:
                                            Precedent.
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CMSR. SCOTT: Excuse me, precedent.

Thank you.

MR. PLATZER: Yes. Precisely. We're not asking the Commission here today to hold that our VoIP provider is not a public utility in light of Senate Bill 48. We're merely asking for the finding that they "are a public utility" to be vacated as moot, such that, in the unlikely event that some dispute were to arise in the future, the Commission's hands would be free to rule any way on that that it sought, that there wouldn't be any precedential effect to the vacatur.

CMSR. SCOTT: Thank you.

MS. ROSS: One additional follow-up. Is it Comcast's position then that the exceptions in the savings clause in Senate Bill 48, that talk about laws of general applicability and assessment, would not allow the Commission to collect an assessment directly from Comcast or any other VoIP provider?

MR. PLATZER: It's certainly our position that it does not -- that there's no live controversy about that. That the question of whether the -- sort of the question of whether the assessment is assessed against the VoIP provider or the ELEC is an academic one, because it's the same assessment in either

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               It's not -- it is not our contention that Senate
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       Bill 48 sort of preempts or precludes the assessment of
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       the Commission -- the Commission's fees, I believe it's
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       363-A, it's not our position that that is one of the
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       regulations that is precluded by Senate Bill 48.
       rather that it doesn't matter where they're assessed, the
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       way the fixed VoIP providers tend to be structured.
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                         CMSR. HARRINGTON: But is your position
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       that the VoIP revenues need or must be imputed to the ELEC
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       and the total amount of combined revenues is used for the
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       assessment?
                         MR. PLATZER: We've -- that's certainly
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       the way that we have historically calculated and paid
       those assessments in New Hampshire. And, we don't believe
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       there's any controversy that the way that we've
       historically done it complies with the law. Which we
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       don't believe --
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                         CMSR. HARRINGTON:
                                            I quess my question
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       would be --
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                         (Court reporter interruption - cellphone
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                         ringing.)
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                         CMSR. HARRINGTON:
                                            Let me just say,
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       since there are some issues about assessments that are in
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       front of us, among other issues, I'm just trying to get a
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little clarification on this. You're saying that you believe that complies with the law or that it's required by the law?

MR. PLATZER: And, we certainly believes that it complies with the law. I believe you're referencing that there's -- I'm aware that there is also a dispute about the exact methodology that's used to compute the amount of assessment that public utilities need to pay, based on whether interstate revenues are included or not, but we believe that's an entirely independent issue from the question of whether or not the assessment technically falls on the VoIP provider or the ELEC. So, one has no -- one has not bearing or effect on the other.

CMSR. HARRINGTON: I'm not trying to say they're related, other than that there was a methodology that had been done for a while, and now people are challenging it. So, I guess my question is, do you see this combination of the VoIP revenues being imputed to their associated ELEC, and then using that total for the assessment value as something that could be challenged? Simply because it's been done in the past does not mean —no one's challenged that. So, would it be something that Comcast would be looking at? Again, I get back to my original question is, doing that you believe complies with

the law, and no one said "No, No. You're paying too much money." But does it -- is it required by the law?

MR. PLATZER: We don't believe that the mechanism is mandatory. We do believe that the mechanism complies with the law. We have no intentions of changing it. And, in the event we -- in the highly speculative event that a VoIP provider were not to do it that way, then the Commission might have a live controversy before it. But that live controversy does not exist here today.

CHAIRMAN IGNATIUS: Why don't you wrap up, and then we'll have a few more questions.

MR. PLATZER: Okay. And, the final point I wanted to raise, about why there's no controversy, and we also heard the "universal service" argument floated by the independents as to why "public utility" designation might still matter. Of course, they're — and, it's not entirely clear whether they were talking about POLR obligations or universal service contributions. But, in the event POLR obligations were to be created by the Commission at some point in the future, we think that that would quite clearly be precluded as a term or condition of service, that Senate Bill 48 prevents the Commission from imposing on VoIP providers, in the event that it involves contributions to some future state universal service fund.

We also think that there's no controversy there, because the FCC has spoken rather clearly in recent years about what types of universal contributions -- universal service contributions state commissions are allowed to impose on VoIP providers.

So, answering the question of what the Commission might be able to do in the future about a state universal service fund, doesn't require a determination of whether or not the VoIP provider is a public utility, because there's pretty clear FCC law on that one.

CHAIRMAN IGNATIUS: Throughout this morning, you've been referring to "VoIP providers" sort of in general. In your brief, you specifically identified Comcast Digital Voice as an "integrated VoIP service". Is there a difference, in terms of the regulatory response? Is your argument the same for all VoIP providers or for a variety of different things that Comcast may provide? Or, is it specific to an interconnected voice service?

MR. PLATZER: Our arguments are -- were sort of crafted with a fixed interconnected VoIP service in mind. And, that's because they tend to be structured the way that Comcast is structured, which is that there is -- there is a CLEC to whom -- by whom all of the relevant regulations preserved by the savings clause would fall.

Such that there's no real -- there's no dispute or no controversy as to whether or not those regulations also fall on the affiliated VoIP provider.

CHAIRMAN IGNATIUS: I know I'm mindful of the admonitions of FairPoint that we not answer questions that haven't been asked us. And, so, we're not looking to determine everything about every possible provision of VoIP service in the future. I just want to be sure I understand what your position is, and that's the "fixed interconnected VoIP service" is what you're talking about here?

MR. PLATZER: That's correct.

CHAIRMAN IGNATIUS: You also said in the brief that CDV now requires a broadband connection to operate. And, is that -- am I correct in that? And, just is it a factual underpinning, is that correct?

MR. PLATZER: In the since that there -so, it's correct in the sense that there needs to be a
physical broadband connection to the end-user's premises.

It was not meant to suggest that the end-user needs to
also subscribe to Comcast's internet service in order to
purchase CDV, that's not -- wasn't the intention of that,
in that respect, it's not changed.

And, where there are some -- there are

some nomadic features that are offered through some business services, I believe we articulated in some of the supplemental briefing in 09-044, but those also require that there be some kind of physical broadband connection. And, which we don't think there's any dispute here that, as the Legislature defined a "VoIP service" for purposes of Senate Bill 48, that CDV and its various different business and residential applications, always falls within that definition.

CHAIRMAN IGNATIUS: You had said that both the legislative history and the language of Senate Bill 48 itself bar direct regulation. And, I know you've read others' briefs. At least one party says "there's nothing other than the legislative history to support that, and the legislative history shouldn't be governing here because there's no confusion." So, what's your response to that? What is it in the Bill itself you're turning to, separate from the legislative history?

MR. PLATZER: Well, certainly, the text of 362:7, II, itself, is the first place that we look for that. I mean, it's -- the language that the Legislature used was certainly very broad: "Law, rule, regulation, ordinance, standard, order, or other provision having the force of law", as well as "market entry, market exist,

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transfer of control, rates, terms, conditions of service". The expansiveness of the language that the Legislature used, both in terms of the types of rules that were covered and the types of subjects those rulings could address, indicate that they were sort of trying to hit everything under the Sun, unless it was a called out in the savings clause.

The second place we get that from is that, in addition to the prohibition on direct regulation, there's also this additional broadening language in the text of the statute that — that says, not only directly regulating, but "has the effect of regulating", which is even — which is broad — goes even beyond the prohibition on these types of regulations, to also prohibition on any kind of regulations that would have the effect of affecting these various different areas.

And, certainly, in the context of some -- in a different statute, which we cited in our briefs, the Supreme Court has, in the past, viewed that as -- that "has the effect of" language as encompassing a very broad scope.

And, then, finally, we think that the savings clause itself, by sort of articulating like an enumerated list of the various different laws and

regulations that still apply, suggest that that's what's Those are the areas that the Commission has authority to regulate VoIP providers. We'd also note that, under the statute, VoIP providers are treated identically to IP-enabled services. And that the same regulations are both precluded and preserved for both categories of services. The Legislature treated VoIP services and IP-enabled services as identical for purposes of SB 48. And, we certainly think that whatever sort of the unresolved state of federal law may be with respect to VoIP services, it's quite clear that IP-enabled services are not subject to public utility regulation via the states. And, that's been established for quite some time. So, the fact that the Legislature treated VoIP and IP-enabled services as essentially identical for regulatory purposes, also, in our mind, speak to a very broad intention of the Legislature, consistent with the legislative history. CHAIRMAN IGNATIUS: Would a requirement that a fixed VoIP provider register with the Commission

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CHAIRMAN IGNATIUS: Would a requirement that a fixed VoIP provider register with the Commission with name, contact numbers, mailing address, would that be a form of direct regulation or have the effect of regulating in a way that you think is prohibited by Senate Bill 48?

1 MR. PLATZER: We believe that would fall 2 under the market entry requirements, yes. 3 CHAIRMAN IGNATIUS: Even an 4 informational filing, a name and a phone number? 5 MR. PLATZER: Yes. We believe that the 6 market entry encompasses the types of registration and 7 reporting requirements that are in the Commission's CLEC 8 regulations. 9 CHAIRMAN IGNATIUS: All right. Anything further from the Bench? 10 11 MS. ROSS: Yes, I have a few follow-ups. 12 A moment ago you indicated that IP-enabled service and VoIP service are treated differently under the federal 13 14 regime. Does, and I'll use CDV, although I understand 15 you've migrated to a new service, but does CDV meet all of the requirements of the definition of "IP-enabled 16 1.7 service", apart from the exclusiveness of the VoIP 18 definition under Senate Bill 48? 19 MR. PLATZER: As resistant as I am to 20 fight the hypo, which I know you're never supposed to do, 21 I just want to clear up, it's not our position that IP-enabled services and VoIP services are treated 22 23 differently under the federal regime. It's rather that 24 federal law has been very clear for a long time, that

states can't regulate IP-enabled services. Whereas, the FCC hasn't spoken yet on VoIP. Although, a couple of federal district courts have gone the same place. But we certainly concede that, for purposes of the classification of CDV, that, because the definition of "IP-enabled service" in the statute says that "VoIP services are not included within that definition." That the basic voice functionality of CPA -- CDV, the calling features, fall within the "VoIP service" definition of the statute, and not within the "IP-enabled services" definition.

Certainly, the various ancillary communications features that are also part of the whole communications package, like the online -- like online voicemail and calls showing up on your television screen, and accessing your service through your mobile phone through an app. All of those features would fall under IP-enabled service, but the calling itself does not fall under the "IP-enabled service" definition in the statute.

MS. ROSS: On Pages 8 and 9 of your brief, you reference a small set of regulations that might apply to VoIP providers if they're public utilities. What are those and why is it relevant that Comcast CLEC affiliates comply with those regulations?

MR. PLATZER: If you don't mind I'll

just grab the brief. So, what we had done on Pages 8 and 9, as well as again later in our brief on Pages 13 and 14, was an attempt to answer the question the Commission had asked about which of the CLEC regulations still turn on a "public utility" designation. Or are -- and/or are preserved -- and are preserved by the savings clause. that was our best attempt to do the crosswalk between the statutes that the Legislature had called out in the savings clause is still applying, notwithstanding the general bar on regulation of VoIP services. And, then, limit those to the ones where the "public utility" designation still matters, as opposed to applying based on some general criteria. And, the reason that we had shown that each of those either applies to the CLEC or a cable provider in any event, was just to make the point that there's no live case or controversy here. So, in our view, the reason that it matters that, when you look at the savings clause and you look at each statute and each implementing regulation by the Commission, that if that is preserved by SB 48, there is no contracase or controversy as to whether or not Comcast is operating in compliance with any of those, such that -- and, that's in furtherance of our argument that the case is moot. Because, if the public -- if a "public utility"

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designation of a "VoIP provider" would only preserve this vanishingly small set of regulations, and all of those regulations are regulations that really sort of are targeting the wrong entity. They affect the CLEC, rather than the VoIP provider, then there's no controversy for the Commission to resolve.

MS. ROSS: If the Legislature did not consider VoIP and IP-enabled services to be public utilities under 362:2, II, why was it necessary for the Legislature to exempt VoIP and IP-enabled services from public utility regulation regarding market entry, exit, transfer of control and rates?

MR. PLATZER: If the Legislature had simply accepted VoIP and IP-enabled services from the definition of a "public utility" by changing the "public utility" definition, then the law would have been substantially narrower than the one that the Legislature actually passed. Because, as we attempted to show in our brief, a lot of the -- a lot of the relevant statutes and regulation don't turn on whether or not an entity is a public utility or not, but rather apply based on various other criteria. And, if all the Legislature had done was amend the "public utility" designation, then there would still be a lot of other state laws, rules, and regulations

1 that would still apply, because something doesn't have to 2 be a public utility for them to apply, but the Legislature 3 wanted to exempt VoIP providers and IP-enabled service 4 providers from having to comply with it. 5 So, we think that the fact that they 6 carved out regulations and then put in a savings clause, 7 actually is a much broader preclusion of regulation than 8 the Legislature would have accomplished if they had merely 9 amended the "public utility" definition. MS. ROSS: Is there a difference between 10 11 an end-user in the statute's definition of "IP-enabled services" and an end-user in the statute's definition of 12 "VoIP"? 13 14 If you don't mind, I'll MR. PLATZER: 15 take a moment to look at the statute. It's not a question 16 I had focused on beforehand. 17 (Short pause.) 18 MR. PLATZER: And, just to be clear, the 19 question is whether or not an end-user has a different 20 definition for "IP-enabled service" or a "VoIP provider" 21 under the statute? 22 MS. ROSS: Right. 23 MR. PLATZER: It's our position that 24 this -- the definition of "end-user" doesn't apply either.

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       Like I said, a customer of a VoIP service provider or a
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       customer of an IP-enabled service would not qualify as an
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       end-user under the statute, because it is limited to
       telecommunications service customers. And, as the
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       Commission knows, it's Comcast's position that our VoIP
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       service is an information service, not a
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       telecommunications service, under federal law.
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                         MS. ROSS: And, yet, the statute does
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       use the term "end-user" in connection with VoIP and
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       IP-enabled services?
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                         MR. PLATZER: And, it certainly has a
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       definition of "end-user" in the statute, but that
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       definition does not -- does not appear again in the VoIP
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       -- in the definition of a VoIP services, that speaks of
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       users, but doesn't incorporate the "end-user" definition
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       from I, subpart (a).
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                         MS. ROSS: It does with regard to
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       IP-enabled service.
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                         MR. PLATZER: You're right, it does.
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       And, I don't have an explanation for what the Legislature
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      was thinking in that regard. But, certainly, the fact
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      that the "end-user" definition, as it's used in the
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       statute, speaks of "customers of telecommunications
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       services". Certainly, an IP-enabled service is not a
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telecommunications service under federal law. So, I -- I
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       understand the point, which is that the same words do
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       appear there. But there doesn't appear to be any legal
       effect or significance to the fact that the term
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       "end-user" is used in the IP-enabled service definition.
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                         MS. ROSS: Thank you. I have no further
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       questions.
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                         MR. PLATZER:
                                       Thank you.
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                         CHAIRMAN IGNATIUS: Commissioner Scott.
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                         CMSR. SCOTT: Yes, we're giving you much
       longer than ten minutes. I just wanted to clarify, you
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       mentioned regarding the definition of "telephone utility",
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       I think, the "savings clause". I just wanted to make sure
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       I understood what section you were talking about that you
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       were considering the savings clause there.
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                         MR. PLATZER: It's Roman -- it's III.
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                         CMSR. SCOTT: Okay. That's helpful.
       Thank you. And, again, I don't want to put words in your
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       mouth, which is why I'm asking. Are you saying, if it's
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       not in the savings clause, then it can't be regulated?
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                         MR. PLATZER:
                                       That's correct. It's our
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       position that the language -- the language in II that
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      precludes -- that precludes regulation, unless it falls
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       under the III savings clause, is so broad that, when read
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in combination with the legislative history, I believe

it's intended to preclude all regulations not specifically
excepted.
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CMSR. SCOTT: I guess I would ask you to opine on it. Then, why would they give -- so, are you saying market entry/exit, transfer of control, rates, terms or conditions," those are examples, not specifics that are -- is that correct?

MR. PLATZER: We think that the combination of that, with the "have the effect of" language in the statute, is broad enough to encompass anything that's in the Commission's CLEC regulations.

And, so, we did the walk-through, I believe on Pages 13 and 14 of our brief, where these were the regulations we were able to find that did not appear to be precluded by the language in II or excepted by the savings clause in III.

CMSR. SCOTT: Okay. So, you're suggesting then that the market entry/exit, etcetera, are not necessarily the driving factors, but more -- but what's more broad is the word "effect" of regulating?

MR. PLATZER: We think it's the combination of those two, combined with the legislative history, which had a very broad statement that "the goal

was to preclude telecommunications" -- public utility -"telecommunications regulation of VoIP providers." And,
the fact that IP-enabled services and VoIP services are
treated the same under II of the statute. And, it's sort
of well known and well established in the
telecommunications world that IP-enabled services can't be
subject to state public utility regulation.

CMSR. SCOTT: So, why do you think those, if that's your position, if that's why it's so broad, and, again, I know you don't -- I'm not in the mind of the Legislature, but why do you think they wouldn't have just said, "it's not regulated, with the exception of those items in the savings clause"? Why would they put these examples in?

MR. PLATZER: It appears to be an attempt to be as comprehensive as possible. I understand that the argument is that, when they try to be this comprehensive, people will try to brainstorm things that might — that they might have left — technically left out. But we think that, in combination with the legislative history, the "have the effect of" language, the fact that they're treated the same as IP-enabled services, that the Legislature really was trying to cover the gamut of everything here. As a practical matter, we

also, I'd say, we combed through the CLEC regulations and tried to find things that wouldn't fall in here. And, the ones that we found are all things that are excepted by the savings clause.

CMSR. SCOTT: Okay. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN IGNATIUS: Commissioner

Harrington.

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CMSR. HARRINGTON: Yes, I just had a question, maybe a clarification. On the pole attachment issue, in your brief on Page 11 and 12, you talk about "whether a public utility" and so forth. But I was trying to get finally your opinion on the -- another part of SB 48, which added a new section to RSA 34 -- 374:34-a. it says, I'll read Section VIII, I'll just read it to you because you don't have it in front of you: "The Commission shall retain its authority to regulate the safety, vegetation management, emergency response, and storm restoration requirements for poles, conduits, ducts, pipes, and pole attachments, wires, cables, and related plant and equipment of public utilities and other private entities located within the public right-of-way, on, over, and under state lands and water bodies." And, I guess my question is, are you interpreting that section to limit the Commission's authority to just those things to

regulate safety, vegetation management, emergency response and storm restoration requirements? Or, does it still have the capability for setting rates, charges, terms and conditions and to have authority to hear and resolve complaints concerning rates, charges, terms and conditions that's stated in earlier sections in that same RSA?

MR. PLATZER: The latter. It's not our position that SB 48 limited the Commission's authority over pole attachments in any way, nor is it our position that the exemption of VoIP services from regulation in SB 48 somehow took away from the Commission's authority to set rates in that regard. Our position on the pole attachment issue is, first, there's just the purely regulatory argument that we just don't believe that whether or not the VoIP provider is a public utility or not matters for purposes of what the rates ought to be, the way that the statute and the regulations are written now.

And, second, that there's no controversy here, because, to the extent that there was a dispute about whether or not VoIP services have to pay a different rate, that dispute now appears to be settled, and settled with a unitary rate, where it does matter if it's the cable provider or the VoIP provider, who's ownership you

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impute the cable for that purpose. So, we don't think
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       that SB 48 took away the Commission's authority over pole
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       attachment rates. We just don't believe that, whether or
       not our VoIP provider is a public utility, has any
       significance for that -- for that area.
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                         CMSR. HARRINGTON: All right.
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             I guess it just leaves us with the -- trying to
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       figure out what indeed the purpose of that new section of
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       the law is supposed to do, if it's not that. You're
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       saying it does not limit the authority just to those
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       things, but it's for whatever reason reiterated that
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       authority.
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                         MR. PLATZER: And, it's certainly not
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       uncommon for legislatures to engage in overkill by putting
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       redundant language in to make sure that people don't
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       misread what they were trying to do. We certainly don't
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       see anything in SB 48 that limits the Commission's
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       authority over pole attachment rates.
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                         CMSR. HARRINGTON:
                                            Thank you.
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                         CHAIRMAN IGNATIUS:
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       you for your responses and working through that.
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                         We move now to Mr. Moore, for
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      AT&T/Verizon.
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                                     I'll make this very brief.
                         MR. MOORE:
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Just one housekeeping matter to clarify. I'm not here representing AT&T. We filed a joint brief, but I only represent Verizon.

We agree with Comcast. The statute is comprehensive. Paragraph II essentially says "Thou shall not regulate VoIP", and it does it in very broad language. One piece of the language that the Commission just discussed just now is the phrase, in the third line, where it says "either directly or indirectly". So, it's saying that "no agency or subdivision of the state can even indirectly enforce any law that even has the effect of regulating", and then all those different elements of VoIP service or aspects of it. So, we think that that covers it. And, paragraph III then provides the exceptions.

But we also agree with Comcast that, if it's possible for an issue to arise where the Commission could regulate VoIP or IP, other than the listed exceptions, you don't have that case in front of you now. And, the Commission would be much more prudent to await for an actual fact situation to arise, so it has actual facts to look at to address any of those issues. We're confident that, if that ever comes up, you will find that you can't regulate VoIP. But, in any event, prudence would dictate that you wouldn't make speculative decisions

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now, without having some hard facts in front of you.
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       That's all we have to add. Thank you.
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                         CHAIRMAN IGNATIUS: All right.
       struck that in your filing you took a different tack than
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       Comcast did on the question of "whether the service was
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       VoIP or IP-enabled?" Comcast has said "it's clearly VoIP,
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       and not IP-enabled", in which definitions it met. Yours
       said "it's one or the other", as if it was not important
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       to distinguish which it is.
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                         MR. MOORE: Well, let's --
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                         CHAIRMAN IGNATIUS: Did I misread your
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       brief?
                         MR. MOORE: By the statutory definition,
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       it excludes -- it expressly excludes VoIP from the
       definition of "IP-enabled". So, it just can't be both
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       under the statute. All right? But, if you didn't have
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       that exclusion, you could certainly argue that a VoIP
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       service falls within the larger set of IP -- VoIP is
       IP-enabled, it uses an IP, Internet protocol.
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       statute has an express provision in the definition of
       "IP-enabled" to exclude VoIP, so that they are two
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       separate things under the statute.
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                         CHAIRMAN IGNATIUS: And, I think you
       took the similar position that Comcast did that, because
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1 you've got both the VoIP provider and the regulated ELEC 2 in place, or the cable operator, that some things, some of 3 the regulatory requirements are picked up by those other 4 entities, they don't -- you don't have to worry about 5 whether they're being picked up by the VoIP provider. First of all, is that fair to put that in as a position? 6 7 Well, no. We were just MR. MOORE: 8 working off the facts in this case, which is all about 9 Comcast/CDV, not any service by Verizon. 10

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CHAIRMAN IGNATIUS: All right.

MR. MOORE: So, we don't intend to take -- put in any new facts or discuss what's in the services that our companies provide. But, certainly, the facts as the Commission found it on the first round in this case are -- addressed the way that Comcast has its business structured.

So, if, as I asked CHAIRMAN IGNATIUS: Mr. Platzer, if, for some reason, the ELEC was no longer in business in New Hampshire or was no longer certified, or the cable provider that is -- cable TV provider, I assume we're talking about, that might be picking up the Dig Safe requirements were not in place anymore, what does that mean for the regulatory concerns that Senate Bill 48 seems to still hold as important for any provider?

you're not -- if the ones who were picking it up aren't there, for whatever reason, --

MR. MOORE: Yes. No, I think -- I see what you're saying. I think that I agree with Mr. Platzer as well, that that's very unlikely to happen. But, if you could have a situation where there was just a VoIP provider, without working with a CLEC entity, then, again, the Commission would have to look at the particular dispute that was in front of it. I mean, you can imagine someone saying, I'll make a silly example, someone comes into the Commission and says "You should regulate the rates that that provider offers." And, you would very quickly say "No, we can't do that. That's very clear."

Well, could someone come up with an issue that the Commission could find a way to regulate, even though it's not listed in III? We don't think so. And, you can brainstorm about that. But, if you get to the point of brainstorming, then your answer from this case should be "We'll vacate the decision, and we'll see if that ever arises."

So, you know, we can come up with lots of arguments. There was a question earlier about "whether registration would be a barrier to the market?"

Absolutely. Whether imposing an assessment? Well, our

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position is, certainly, if you're saying to a provider 1 that, "if you do business in our state, we're going to make you pay part of the budget of some state agencies", that's a barrier to entry. But, again, there's no point or reason for the Commission to be reaching that decision today. And, you may never reach it. It may never happen. 7 CHAIRMAN IGNATIUS: Well, why is that --I guess I'm not following that. Why is there not a question for -- I'm going to get too many nots in here. 10 Isn't one of the things we're looking at today to evaluate 11 for the sake of the Supreme Court whether registration processes that we called for in our orders coming out of 09-044 still appropriate, notwithstanding Senate Bill 48? That's not a speculative question, that's what we're 15 looking at today. 16 MR. MOORE: I think, I can let Comcast answer that better, but my understanding is that Comcast 17 says "our CLEC is registered", and so there's no issue there. You don't have a -- I don't know, call it a "pure 20 VoIP provider" that has said "no, we won't register." 21

CHAIRMAN IGNATIUS: It seems odd to me, though, that a question of regulatory jurisdiction should depend on the particular facts of each provider. I think of jurisdiction as fairly clean, and it either is or it

isn't. And, to say "well, it might be in certain facts, but it isn't in this case, because there's other regulated providers who are going to pick up those duties. But, if you get to the point where you're a stand-alone VoIP, where there are no other providers, then it might be, and at that point you should take it up."

MR. MOORE: Well, it might be, but there are lots of instances in which that happens. For example, Comcast's structure in the state, and in many states, is set up specific -- for a number of reasons, but one of which is so that they can interconnect with different carriers, because there's been controversy about whether a VoIP carrier is entitled to interconnect with an ILEC. And, so, Comcast has this set up, and I think others do it as well, where their CLEC in the state interconnects. So, it is very much the fact that the structure that they have chosen to do business does make a difference.

So, I'd say the same thing applies here in another respect. That, if you, and, again, keep in mind what Mr. Platzer said earlier, it is awful difficult to understand how a VoIP provider could do business on its own, without being tied in some way to a carrier that is entitled to interconnect.

So, I don't think you have any such

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       situation in the state, and it's kind of hard to see that
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       you ever could.
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                         CHAIRMAN IGNATIUS: Any other questions?
       Ms. Ross.
                         MS. ROSS: What is the significance of
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       or what is the reason for having VoIP services and
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       IP-enabled services be exclusive categories --
                         MR. MOORE: I don't know.
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                         MS. ROSS: -- under Senate Bill 48?
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                         MR. MOORE: I don't know the answer to
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       that.
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                         MS. ROSS: Would there be any problem if
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       the Commission revoked IP-enabled service providers' CLEC
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       authority?
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                         MR. MOORE: If the Commission did what?
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                         MS. ROSS: Revoked CLEC authority for
17
       IP-enabled providers?
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                         MR. MOORE: I don't know what that
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       means. CLEC authority?
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                         MS. ROSS: CLEC authority is our
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       registration for competitive local exchange carriers.
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       would be considered, I believe, at least the position
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       we've heard argued that says it would be a barrier to
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       entry to require registration. So, my question is, what,
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       if anything, would happen if the Commission revoked CLEC
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       authority for its IP-enabled providers?
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                         MR. MOORE: Again, I don't think there
       are any pure IP-enabled providers, certainly not that have
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 5
       interconnection. But, if you were -- if there were such a
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       thing, then my argument would be that they don't need
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       registration in this state. That would be a barrier to
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       market entry, and you're not allowed to do that. But I
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       don't think that it can come up here.
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                         MS. ROSS:
                                    Do you think the VoIP
1.1
       services defined in 362:7 is the service which was
12
       preempted by the FCC's 2004 Vonage order?
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                         MR. MOORE: Yes. Well, I think that,
14
       certainly, state regulation of VoIP services, whether
15
       fixed or nomadic, is preempted by federal law. We all
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       know that the FCC hasn't actually weighed in on that, but
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       I don't think you would need that. But that's exactly one
       of the issues that would have been appealed had the
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       statute not passed.
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                         MS. ROSS: Does your company provide
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      VoIP services?
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                         MR. MOORE:
                                     Excuse me?
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                         MS. ROSS: Does your company provide
24
      VoIP services?
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1 MR. MOORE: Yes. MCI Communications 2 Services is a subsidiary of Verizon. It operates in New 3 Hampshire. It's an IXC -- or, was an IXC, now it's an 4 ELEC. I guess everyone is an ELEC almost. And, they do 5 provide VoIP services. So, that's another way, actually, 6 that's a good example how -- that company is structured a 7 little differently than Comcast. It's one company that 8 provides multiple services. So, you know, mostly they 9 provide services to large companies. And, the large 10 company can come to us and get traditional -- some traditional TBM circuit switched services --11 12 (Court reporter interruption.) 13 MR. MOORE: I'm sorry. They can come to 14 MCI Communications and obtain both traditional TBM circuit 15 switched services and VoIP services. 16 MS. ROSS: Is that service that your 17 describing as "VoIP" nomadic or fixed? 18 MR. MOORE: I think they have got some 19 I'm not really sure. But, again, I don't think 20 it's -- well, first, you know, our service is not at issue 21 in this case. But it doesn't matter, even if it were, 22 because it's one company providing it. So that, you know, 23 MCI is registered with the Commission and so on, because

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it's an IXC.

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                         MS. ROSS: Is your VoIP service provided
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       by a registered CLEC?
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                         MR. MOORE: No, it's an IXC. Well, it's
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       an ELEC, I guess. We also --
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                         MS. ROSS: Is it currently registered as
       a CLEC?
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                         MR. MOORE:
                                    No.
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                         MS. ROSS: Was it registered as a CLEC
 9
       prior to Senate Bill 48?
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                         MR. MOORE:
                                    No. We have MCI, MCI Metro
11
       Business Transmission Services is -- was registered as a
12
       CLEC in New Hampshire. I don't think they provide VoIP.
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                         MS. ROSS: What services do they
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       provide?
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                         MR. MOORE: Oh, they're -- it's the --
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       they're a CLEC. They're a local exchange.
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                         MS. ROSS: Is there a difference between
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       an "end-user" in the statute's definition of "IP-enabled
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       services" and a "user" in the statute's definition of
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       "VoIP"?
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                         MR. MOORE: You know, I don't see it.
22
       don't see a difference. I know that it was defined, and
       that the definition of "IP" uses "end-user", and the
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24
       definition of "VoIP" uses "user". I can't tell you any
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practical significance of the difference.

MS. ROSS: Thank you.

CHAIRMAN IGNATIUS: Thank you,

Mr. Moore. We move to Mr. Malone.

MR. MALONE: Thank you, madam Chair. As I've been listening to the two previous parties, I think that the issues that seem to be coming to the top here regard the breadth of the exemption that SB 48 grants to VoIP providers, and also the issue of a "case in controversy", which, as an initial matter, I'll tell you that I think is a bit of a red herring. Because we're not talking about a "case of controversy", we're talking about a legal definition, one that sets the ground rules for the entire industry. Which, as Chairman Ignatius indicated, doesn't necessarily lend itself to a factual inquiry.

There are -- I'll start off with just three things that I think that we all need to take note of. Is that Senate Bill 48 did not expressly vacate or revoke the rule -- the VoIP orders in any way, or even reference them. Secondly, it did not alter or even mention the status of VoIP as a statutory telephone service, or, aside from certain regulatory exemptions unique to VoIP distinguish it from statutory telephone service. And, most importantly, number three, it did

create a blanket exemption for VoIP from any and all laws related to telecommunications service.

Now, Comcast, in their brief, said that SB 48 "emphatically rejected the proposition that VoIP should be regulated". And, Attorney Platzer said that that phrase was "expansive". But that's not what the plain words of the statute say. As Commissioner Scott indicated earlier, it lists certain things that it applies to.

And, with your permission, I'd like to give you an example of how the Legislature does emphatically reject the regulation of a particular industry. If you look in the statute that immediately precedes the one we're talking about, RSA 362:6, and I have copies that I'd be happy to distribute, if people would like them?

CHAIRMAN IGNATIUS: If it's not lengthy, just go ahead and read it.

MR. MALONE: Okay. It says, and I'm going to take out some of the descriptors, but it says "The term "public utility" shall not include any provider of cellular mobile radio communications services. Such services shall not be subject to the jurisdiction of the Public Utilities Commission pursuant to this title." So,

what I'm saying, and when I read that, is that that is an emphatic statement that "we're not going to regulate a particular industry." It's a rule of statutory interpretation that legislators presume to mean what they say and know how to say it. And, this is what they did with CMRS. And, if they were emphatically removing VoIP from all Commission regulation, it seems to me that that's how they would have worded it. But they didn't. They put in conditions. Conditions that, you know, that the Commission could only regulate market entry, market exit, transfer of control, rates, terms, or conditions.

But, as we discussed in our brief, there are lots of areas of Commission authority that it does not exclude. Some of them are called out in 367:7, in III, which Attorney Platzer did talk about, but this is not an exclusive list. And, this gets to this discussion of the savings cause.

I'm not 100 percent sure what a "savings clause" really is, and the definition can be kind of fluid. But the way -- this does not read like a savings clause to me, it reads like an explanatory clause or what they sometimes call an "interpretive directive". And, you know, in fact, if you look at the -- at the beginning of III, it says "The prohibitions of paragraph II shall not

be construed to: "Okay, there's no exceptional language there. This is a guide to interpretation. This is saying "let's, you know, be sure, when you're interpreting the statute, that you don't include these things in the definition of "market entry", "market exit", etcetera, etcetera. A savings clause would have applied more to that particular statute. For instance, it would have said, "you cannot regulate market entry, except for these markets" or "you cannot regulate the types of, you know, terms and conditions except for these types of customers." Or, one that's probably more pertinent to SB 48, you cannot regulate anything other than basic service. That's, I think, what a savings clause is.

And, so, this is not a clause that is limiting the Commission's jurisdiction. It's a clause that is merely enlightening, it's giving interpretive guidance for what that statute means.

In terms of what, you know, I'd like to talk a little bit about the nature and purpose of the original proceeding. And, this sort of lends itself to the "case in controversy" issue that's come up. The Commission asked, and it was interesting phrasing, actually, "in light of the nature and purpose of DT 09-044", it asks for the significance of those findings in

light of SB 48.

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Comcast has tried to frame this as an exercise in "abstract curiosity". And, described the beginning of this proceeding as one where -- that referenced the concern of the RLECs about unregulated competitors. Well, the RLECs are much more than concerned. They're vitally interested in the concept of "competitive neutrality", or, as the New Hampshire Supreme Court has said, "fair and balanced legal and regulatory environment". And, the question that was being answered in DT 09-044 was "does Comcast get special treatment or do cable VoIP providers get special treatment? And, if they do, how does everyone else get that special treatment as well?" That was what -- that was the relief that they were asking for. So, 09-044 was not necessarily a case in controversy, it was an investigation that the Commission was empowered to conduct, to answer a basic question about the ground rules on how public utilities conduct themselves in New Hampshire.

Now, we concede that, as of SB 48, VoIP providers do get treated differently. But they're not exempt from all regulation. And, I think the one that we've been focusing on is assessments. Now, Comcast has indicated that, through their CLEC affiliate, they pay

assessments based on their VoIP revenues. But what we need to emphasize is, they can stop tomorrow. They're doing this voluntarily. They could stop tomorrow, if they wanted to.

Secondly, we have no way of knowing if they're really paying their fair share. They're self-reporting their VoIP revenues. We don't know how much of the revenues that they are imputing to their CLEC affiliate, you know, essentially. And, there's no way that the Commission, if Comcast is correct about the Commission's limited jurisdiction under SB 48, there is no way that the Commission can investigate that.

Now, on information and belief, I believe that Comcast is one of the largest telephone companies in the state. I think this is, you know, they have an immediate need to report their telephone revenues. So, if you're looking for an active case in controversy, that's one right there. I think it's a very important issue.

On the issue of pole attachments, I do agree, once again, that there's a settlement in DT 12-084. But I remind you that it's a settlement among a few select parties. And, it's also a settlement that, if I read it correctly, does not address anything going on in the

federal court case, about retroactive relief, which, once again, will turn -- turns on the issue of whether VoIP providers are telephone companies.

There are other things, and as we

There are other things, and as we discuss in our brief, this is really more of a discussion for what goes on in a Puc 400 rulemaking. But we believe that there are other areas that, you know, do not involve retail, you know, retail customers that may reach cable VoIP providers if they're public utilities. Things like intercarrier obligations. Even in the pole attachment issue, Section 251, which I think Comcast admits still applies per SB 48, the access to poles and conduits is a reciprocal obligation. All local exchange carriers, not just ILECs, are required to provide access. So, once again, with a large carrier like Comcast, maybe that becomes an issue if other carriers want to get access to their poles and conduits. But, if they're not a telephone company, that issue is moot.

We've talked about universal service -- CHAIRMAN IGNATIUS: Can I interrupt you

first?

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MR. MALONE: Sure.

CHAIRMAN IGNATIUS: You may have said it

and I missed it. Why is it, if they're not -- if a VoIP

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1 provider isn't categorized as a telephone company, what 2 then makes them have no obligations to provide access to 3 poles and conduits? 4 MR. MALONE: Under Section 251B, it says 5 that "all local exchange carriers have an obligation to 6 provide access to their poles and conduits." And, I would 7 submit that, if Comcast is not a public utility and is not 8 a telecom carrier in the state, it would be hard to define them as a "local exchange carrier". 9 10 CHAIRMAN IGNATIUS: And, there's no 11 parallel provision that you know of that would apply to 12 other providers who may not be local exchange companies, 13 but still have --14 MR. MALONE: I don't believe so. Ι 15 would have to re-read Section 224 of the federal act to 16 see who the pole attachment obligations run to. 17 reading of 251 is it would only run to telephone 18 companies. 19 CMSR. HARRINGTON: Just to follow up on 20 that. Are you saying then that Comcast has or may have in 21 the future their own poles, and that -- and they would not 22 be required to allow for non-discriminatory access to 23 those pole attachments? 24

I, at the risk of

MR. MALONE:

1 testifying, I don't believe they have poles. I don't know 2 if they have poles. I would suspect they have conduit. 3 There's a lot of green boxes popping up in neighborhoods. But that's about all I can say. I'm just tossing this out 4 as an example. Not of the entire universe of obligations 5 6 they have, but as an example of that, they are not without 7 obligations. 8 CMSR. HARRINGTON: So, under 374:34-a, 9 I, your contention is, if they weren't a public utility, 10 then the obligations having to do with pole, duct, 11 conduit, or right-of-way would not apply to them? 12 MR. MALONE: That's correct. 13 CHAIRMAN IGNATIUS: All right. Please 14 proceed. 15 MR. MALONE: Okay. I've skipped around 16 a little bit, so if you'll bear with me. I was going to 17 talk about universal service. I understand that that is 18 not on a lot of people's radar. And, in these times, is 19 probably not going to be on anyone's radar any time soon. 20 But I have to emphasize that, with the clients I'm 21 representing, the RLECs, this is a critical issue. And, 22 we think about it all the time. And, we believe that at 23 some point a public policy is going to demand that this be 24 dealt with. And, when it's dealt with, it's going to be

1 -- it will, of course, have to involve every 2 telecommunications carrier in the state. I can't predict exactly what that's going to look like. But I think I can 3 safely say that, if the cable companies are exempt from 5 telecommunications regulation, that will have a huge 6 impact on universal service and carrier of last -- how we 7 handle universal service and carrier of last resort. 8 I won't belabor the fact that -- you 9 know, I won't read the statute to you. We believe that the plain meaning of the statute, you know, is -- limits 10 11 the exemption that cable VoIP gets from Commission 12 regulation, to the five things that, you know, market 13 entry, market exit, rates, terms and conditions. 14 There are a number of areas, 15 assessments, pole attachments, universal service, 16 intercarrier relationships, where the Commission still has 17 jurisdiction in many respects. 18 Thank you. I'm open for questions. 19 CHAIRMAN IGNATIUS: Thank you. You know 20

CHAIRMAN IGNATIUS: Thank you. You know that the argument from Comcast and from Verizon and AT&T is that it's not a wise use of resources to force a party to appeal orders that may have been based on law that's no longer in effect. And that, if the underpinnings, in part, were based on state law that's since been changed by

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the Legislature, it's not -- the most efficient thing is to vacate those orders. Do you have any sympathy to that argument?

I would, if I felt the law MR. MALONE: had changed their status. I don't believe it has. The basis of their argument is that SB 48 has relieved them completely of all regulation, and, therefore, there's no basis for their appeal. We disagree. Yes. It has, you know, it's given them broad exemptions. But it has not changed the fact that they're public utilities under the definition of the statute, it has not changed the fact that they're telephone companies, and it has not changed the fact that there are areas of Commission regulation that this -- that SB 48 did not touch. So, the law still applies to them. And, if they don't like the Commission's decisions, then, yes, I believe that is appealable and not moot.

CHAIRMAN IGNATIUS: In your view, are the things that are required, the continuing scope of regulation after those orders in 09-044, those are things that are still allowed for under SB 48?

MR. MALONE: Yes. If you remember, the Commission did not make a list. It just said "they are telephone companies", you know, "if they fit the

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definition as a "public utility" and they are telephone carriers, then they are subject to regulation", to the extent that we have the power to regulate them. And, I believe that, even after SB 48, the Commission does.
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CHAIRMAN IGNATIUS: So, is it your view that the definition of what remains in effect is to be developed in a rulemaking and the response to the Supreme Court should be that the scope of regulation is still being resolved through the rulemaking, but that there's no requirement under 48 that those orders be vacated?

MR. MALONE: Well, if you're asking me, I would suggest a hybrid approach. I believe that there are specific areas in regulation that are fairly clear. I think assessments is fairly clear, I think pole attachments are clear. I think that there are areas that need to be worked out as part of the PUC 400 rulemaking. So, I would anticipate or I would suggest a hybrid response to the Supreme Court, where you list a few items that are clearly still within the Commission's jurisdiction, and leave open the fact that you're undergoing a fairly complicated rulemaking to determine what the rest of those might be.

CHAIRMAN IGNATIUS: Other questions from

the Bench?

1 MS. ROSS: I have a few. 2 CHAIRMAN IGNATIUS: Ms. Ross. 3 MS. ROSS: With regard to whether or not Cable Digital Voice requires a broadband connection to the 4 5 internet, is it your view that the Court mandate would authorize the Commission to reconsider an issue like that? 6 7 MR. MALONE: I have to admit I have not 8 given that any thought. I don't believe that that's the 9 -- I don't believe that that's the extent of the mandate, 10 though. 11 MS. ROSS: Thank you. I believe the 12 RLECs agree that cable VoIP services do meet the 13 definition of "interconnected VoIP", but do not meet the 14 definition of "VoIP" -- I'm sorry. I've got it flipped. 15 Cable voice services do not meet the definition of "Interconnected VoIP", but do meet the definition of 16 17 "VoIP" in Senate Bill 48. What are the differences 18 between the two definitions? And, what are the 19 consequences of falling into one category or the other? 20 MR. MALONE: The definition of "interconnected VoIP" -- you know, at the risk of delving 21 22 into some of 09-044, interconnected VoIP, one of the -it's a four-factor definition. And, one of the 23 24 definitions is that it is converted to IP at the

customer's premises. And, we had a technical and esoteric difference with Comcast as to whether it was, you know, the customer's premises or the customer that was doing the conversion, or whether it was Comcast that was doing the conversion. And, that's why we disagreed. That the VoIP service in 09-044 was interconnected VoIP.

MS. ROSS: And, what is the consequence

MS. ROSS: And, what is the consequence of distinguishing between interconnected VoIP and VoIP as defined under Senate Bill 48?

MR. MALONE: Interconnected VoIP has been found by the FCC to be -- have the possibility of being nomadic. And, because -- and that was the essence of the Vonage order, in which it was nomadic VoIP. The focus of 09-044 was on fixed VoIP, in which the two ends -- or, that the VoIP call was at a fixed location.

MS. ROSS: Would any of the RLECs' conclusions regarding public utility status or which regulations apply change if the Commission were to hold that Comcast voice -- VoIP -- voice, excuse me, was an IP-enabled service, rather than a VoIP service?

MR. MALONE: I think that it wouldn't change the -- it wouldn't change the fact that the Commission's VoIP order, original VoIP order, focused on the functional characteristics of the service, not the

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       technical. You know, it didn't talk about what was being
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       used, what equipment was being used. It simply said, you
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       know, it focused on the actual service, in real-time
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       voice-to-voice communication. So, whether it's an
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       IP-enabled service, whatever that definition means,
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       whether it's a VoIP service, whatever, the fact that it's
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       real-time voice-to-voice would still make it a public
       utility telephone service under the statute.
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                         MS. ROSS: Is there a difference between
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       an "end-user" in the statute's definition of "IP-enabled
       services" and a "user" in the statute's definition of
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       "VoIP services"?
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                         MR. MALONE: We don't believe so.
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                         MS. ROSS: Thank you.
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                         CHAIRMAN IGNATIUS: Questions?
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       Commissioner Harrington.
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                         CMSR. HARRINGTON: Yes, just sort of
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       following up on that last question. Is there a reason why
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       -- we've heard people state earlier that IP-enabled and
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      VoIP are basically -- sort of one is a subset of the
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       other, yet, the Legislature, in SB 48, has made them as
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      two separate, not related or not overlapping categories.
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       Do you know why that was necessary?
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                         MR. MALONE: No, Mr. Commissioner.
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       is where I would come up with my joke about "sausage
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       making".
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                         CMSR. HARRINGTON: Okay.
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                         MR. MALONE: I can't really say why they
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       made a distinction like that.
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                         CMSR. HARRINGTON: And, maybe the same
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       -- I'll solicit the same "sausage-making" response on
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       this. But, having to do with the pole attachment
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       authority, the new section that was added, that talks
       about "the Commission shall retain its authority to
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       regulate" and limits it to only certain things, nothing
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       having to do with rates. Do you think that that -- it was
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       put in to cancel the ratemaking authority with other
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       provisions or is it just a "belt and suspenders" as
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       alluded to by an earlier speaker?
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                         MR. MALONE:
                                      I think it's "belt and
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       suspenders". As I'm sure you know, legislation,
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       particularly legislation as complicated as this, usually
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       represents a number of different interests and
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       compromises, so.
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                         CMSR. HARRINGTON: That's all I had.
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       Thank you.
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                         CHAIRMAN IGNATIUS:
                                             Thank you.
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       you, Mr. Malone.
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                         MR. MALONE:
                                      Thank you.
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                         CHAIRMAN IGNATIUS: Let's go off the
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       record for a moment.
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                         (Brief off-the-record discussion
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                         ensued.)
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                         CHAIRMAN IGNATIUS: All right. Let's go
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       back on the record.
                           We just took a short break to talk
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       about scheduling for the remaining parties here. Our plan
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       is to take a short 15-minute break, and then resume at
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       12:00 with the OCA, and then FairPoint, and then that may
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       be the end of our proceedings, unless we find we have
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       additional questions we need to go back to anyone.
       why don't we regather here at 12:00 sharp. Thank you.
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                         (Recess taken at 11:48 a.m. and the
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                         hearing reconvened at 12:15 p.m.)
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                         CHAIRMAN IGNATIUS: We're back from a
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      break, and we took longer than we planned.
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       apologize for that. We, I think, now have the OCA on
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      board, is that right, Ms. Chamberlin?
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                         MS. CHAMBERLIN: Yes. Yes. And, I'm
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       going to stay here so I can reach all my stuff.
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                         CHAIRMAN IGNATIUS:
                                             That's fine.
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                         MS. CHAMBERLIN:
                                          Susan Chamberlin, for
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       the Consumer Advocate's Office. I want to bring to the
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Commission's attention the fact that the decisions in this case will affect residential users of telecommunications services. And, that we focused on the language of the Commission's order where it states: "The language of RSA 362:2 defines a public utility by the service it renders, not by the technology it uses to provide such service." And, that's a theme that will continue regardless of the technological advances of the telecommunications world. We're in a period of transition. We're going from the copper line to the broadband, but telecommunications will always be in a period of transition. The technology is changing all the time. And, if the definition of a "public utility" depends on that technology, then we will constantly be playing catch-up, we'll constantly be trying to pass laws that capture the future, and that's a difficult place to be.

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The experience of the customer, and this the Commission went into in depth in its decision, is that, here she is making a telephone call, and that customers do not necessarily choose the type of technology they use, they want to choose the service they get. And, the RLECs pointed out that, if the definition of a "public utility" depends on the technology, then, the companies will simply reconfigure their technology so that they get

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a preferable treatment, and that is not fair and equitable regulation.

It's important with SB 48 to look at not only the language that they pass, but the language that they preserved. And, one of those sections is the 374:22-p, "Affordable Television" -- "Telephone Service". And, the aspect that that is important to customers, SB 48 didn't just take that out, they actually added it in and in express language, so that that protection remains. And, without at least a little bit of regulatory authority, there's no way that that affordable telephone service can be put in place. SB 48 did change the significance of the Commission decision that it's a public utility; it did not change the threshold decision itself. The decision is still a controversy that needs to be The fact that we're all here interpreting a statute that is very complex points to that. However, the original determination is uneffected by the change in law.

One of the sections that SB 48 left in place is 374:22-p, III, which states: "The Commission shall seek to ensure that affordable basic telephone services are available to consumers throughout all areas of the state at reasonably comparable rates." So, if the Commission retains that authority, and the exact contours

of, you know, the VoIP exceptions here and there, that remains to be worked out. The Commission has a rulemaking docket that's open. We will work through that interpretation. But, again, it doesn't affect the fundamental decision that the service is -- that the providers are public utilities based on the service that they render.

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And, I think it's important to look back at, you know, we had the Communications Act of 1934. That statute is still in place, as amended. The purpose of the statute is, and I'll make this short, but it's interesting in how comprehensive the regulatory statute is. It's "for the purpose of regulating interstate and foreign commerce in communication, by wire and radio, so as to make available so far as possible to all the people of the United States". So, in the very beginning, we were looking at universal service. "Without discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin or sex, a rapid efficient nationwide and worldwide wire and radio communication service, with adequate facilities at reasonable charges." So, we began here making sure that everyone in the United States gets this service. And, we continue to be in that place.

When we look at the Telecommunications

Act of 1996, it maintained provisions of universal service. So, while we were bringing in competition to offer -- to create more options and to drive prices down, the idea that universal service still will apply was maintained in the statute.

The same with SB 48. It does not take away the universal service obligations. It maintains a competitive playing field for all the companies. It's carving out certain exceptions, but the exact nature of those exceptions has to be worked out, and it has to be worked out in the context of the entire statute, not just the new language.

One of the things we put together, this book [indicating], which is, you know, about an inch thick or so, it's all of the statutes with the new language incorporated. So, it's not just the new language, but it's the old language as well that was kept in. And, it has to be interpreted in a harmonious fashion. So that, seemingly, when you read through some of these, there's a conflict here or there's an inconsistency there, which typically happens, we have to look at it comprehensively.

So, to simply say that "the decision that was made previously is now moot, and we can just go forward and we don't have to decide anything, SB 48 takes

care of it all", is simply too broad a statement.

It does make changes. We're conceding that. But exactly how those changes move forward need to be carefully considered. The controversy that was settled originally remains, and it's been settled, and now we take that fact-finding and we move forward. How is this going to play out in all the different areas?

We support the position of the RLECs.

We think that their interpretation of the statute is consistent with overall goals of competitive equity. And, along with competitive equity, we preserve customer options and affordability. And, while "universal service" has been raised, this is not the place to make broad determinations on universal service, but just to realize that it does have an impact, and it is important.

Customers need to be able to have -- to rely on some small amount of regulatory authority to make sure that their provisions are protected.

CHAIRMAN IGNATIUS: So, is it fair that your recommended response to the Supreme Court would be that there is no need to vacate the orders, that Senate Bill 48 doesn't require any change in the ultimate findings of those orders, but that the details of which regulatory requirements will apply have yet to be

resolved, and that's being done through the rulemaking?

MS. CHAMBERLIN: Yes. That's correct.

CHAIRMAN IGNATIUS: Other questions from the Bench? Commissioner Scott.

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CMSR. SCOTT: Thank you. I just wonder if you could help me a little bit, walk me through. You mentioned 374:22-p still applies under Senate Bill 48.

And, I would -- if you could walk me through the legal logic for that.

MS. CHAMBERLIN: Sure. If you turn to 374 -- let me just find my copy of it. Okay. It starts out, the original statute had just one section, and it says that -- it defined the federal Telecommunications Act of 1996. The SB 48 then went on to define "basic service", "safe and reliable single-party, ability to receive calls", all of these different, they're listed, there's 14, 15 -- 16 of these areas are identified. And, then, it did not remove III, which states: commission shall seek to ensure affordable basic telephone service is available." So, we have to incorporate an interpretation of the new sections, with the old sections, how do they apply? How is it going to work? But the controversy that gave rise to the Commission's decision to begin with, here we have a provider, they're operating,

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       they haven't been registered as a "public utility", do
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       they need to be? Are they a public utility?" That
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       question has been resolved. It's still alive; it's been
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       resolved. SB 48 doesn't change that threshold question,
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       but it does change how the rest of it gets worked out
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       through the rulemaking. We just don't have the -- this
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       particular proceeding does not cover all of the issues
       that are raised. It's not as simple as Comcast has
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       presented.
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                         CMSR. SCOTT:
                                       Thank you.
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                         CHAIRMAN IGNATIUS: Any other questions?
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                         (No verbal response)
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                         CHAIRMAN IGNATIUS: If not, thank you
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       very much.
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                         MS. CHAMBERLIN:
                                          Thank you.
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                         CHAIRMAN IGNATIUS:
                                             Mr. McHugh.
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                         MR. McHUGH:
                                      Chair Ignatius,
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       Commissioner Scott, Commissioner Harrington, and General
       Counsel Ross, good afternoon. Patrick McHugh, here on
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       behalf of Northern New England Telephone Operations, LLC.
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       I'd like to start out, if I could, I have listened to the
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       arguments today. I certainly read the parties' positions
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       last week. And, in light of all of that, I sort of
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       scratched out a proposed order that I'd like you to
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consider, and certainly would ask, on behalf of my client, that you adopt, only two sentences, one's a little bit long, and I'll try and go slow for the court reporter.

What I would propose is that, in light of the Supreme Court's order asking you to take a look at your orders, that this Commission issue a very simple order to read as follows: After fully considering the parties' positions as filed in response to the Commission's order of notice dated October 24, 2012, and as expressed during the hearing on November 16, 2012, Commission Orders 25,262 and 25,274 hereby are vacated as moot, without prejudice to NHTA or any other party to file a specific complaint alleging facts requiring Commission adjudication. Docket numbers DT 09-044 and DT 12-308 shall be closed." That would be the end of the order.

I think, overall, looking at the submissions, while I don't necessarily agree with all that Comcast says, obviously, based on my proposed order, I don't necessarily agree with all of the positions advanced by NHTA.

I think, in terms of the best expression of the case law, is -- was put forth, actually, by Verizon and AT&T, in their joint submission. I don't agree with their entire positions in the case. But, if you look to

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       Page 5, it spills over to Page 6, starting out in the
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       second full paragraph, and they start "Because SB 48
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       establishes", and I would strike basically most of those
       first two lines.
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                         CMSR. HARRINGTON:
                                            Excuse me.
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       you reading from?
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                         MR. McHUGH: Oh.
                                           I apologize,
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       Commissioner.
                      I am on Page 5 of the brief of AT&T
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       Corporation and Verizon.
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                         CMSR. HARRINGTON: And, just give us a
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       second to find that.
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                         MR. McHUGH:
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                         CMSR. HARRINGTON: Okay.
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                         MR. McHUGH:
                                      So, what I think is the
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       best expression of the law, after reading the parties'
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       submissions, really starts in that second paragraph, but I
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       would strike the conclusion that Comcast -- I'm sorry, I
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       apologize, that AT&T Corporation and Verizon put in sort
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       of the first two lines. And, then, basically, I would
       start out with "Comcast's appeal of the orders has become
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      moot." I think the case law supports that. I think that
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       is the right way to go in this present controversy. I do
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      think both dockets should be closed. The Commission has a
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rulemaking docket open, in which the Part 400 rules, I

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submit, are going to be substantially revised in light of Senate Bill 48. But, in any event, we know there are revisions, however you want to categorize or classify it, and maybe we don't need anything, just going to say "there's going to be revisions to the Part 400 rules." That may also lead to revisions to some of the administrative rules in Part 200, dealing with the Commission's procedures.

But I don't think it's appropriate or warranted that the Commission revise the orders in DT 09-044 to essentially become a rulemaking on how you are or are not going to regulate specifically Comcast, and potentially other VoIP providers. FairPoint, at the time, was not a party to that docket. We only joined because we were provided an opportunity by the Commission in its recent order of notice to be a limited intervenor. And, I don't think that it's fair that we turn that proceeding, use those five or six questions to come up with essentially either a revised order or promulgations that essentially are rulemaking. And, our opportunity, and the opportunity of others, who weren't in that original docket, is limited to, I quess, essentially, a brief. course, mine was in a letter format, but that's challenges with Microsoft Word that I have versus really anything

else.

So, the -- and, I do, I guess, want to -- I mean, a lot of the questions asked to me were really hypotheticals, and that shouldn't be decided in this docket what might happen. For example, assessments came up. And, I want to assure the Commission, while I don't agree with Attorney Malone that Comcast, you know, can voluntarily pay or they can decide not to pay, I mean, I can assure you, you know, within an hour of my learning that Comcast isn't going to pay an assessment, Ms. Parker is getting a complaint landing on her desk that will be on the Commission's desk asking for an investigation and demanding that they pay.

Senate Bill 48, I submit, that makes that whole argument, I think that the whole question probably is moot in any event, because, under 362:7, III, it addresses it. I mean, the prohibitions related to how you treat either a VoIP provider or an IP-enabled provider, you know, "shall not be construed to", and then there's a list of exceptions. And, one of them is, "Affect, mandate, or prohibit the assessment of taxes or nondiscriminatory 911 fees, telecommunications relay service fees, or other fees of general applicability."

So, you don't need to decide that in this docket.

To the extent there is some desire to clarify it, that I think is more appropriate for a rulemaking docket. We have a rulemaking docket. And, I think almost all of these general questions, examples, what ifs, they should be decided in the context of a rulemaking docket. They shouldn't be decided in the context of this.

To the extent that NHTA has specific factual circumstances that need to be addressed, it should be afforded a chance to file a new petition, bring it to the Commission, so that it can be adjudicated, with or without the involvement of FairPoint, it depends what the general facts are, which is how I decide anyway whether or not I think FairPoint should be in a docket or not be in a docket.

That's -- I certainly stand on what I wrote and submitted on November 8. I don't feel the need to drag everybody through it in a ten-minute presentation. So, I'm happy to address the Commission's questions or, certainly, if General Counsel Ross has questions, I can address them as well.

CHAIRMAN IGNATIUS: Thank you. Let's assume that we were to do as you say, vacate the orders, and proceed towards the rulemaking that's already

beginning now. What's the starting point for Comcast Digital Voice? I mean, do they come in and say "well, there's no finding, because these orders have been vacated, there's no finding that we're a public utility or not a public utility. We're just out there." Do they submit to the rulemaking? Do they say "you've got no authority over me." Do we begin all over again at that point?

MR. McHUGH: We, at NHTA, provided the Commission with a set of rules. I know there hasn't been any sort of official, I don't know, an official response from the Commission, but the rules are there. In my opinion, those rules were drafted, they cover the Comcast entities. And, if they don't believe they're covered by them, if you were to adopt them, and they got through JLCAR, then they would have to take some affirmative action. And, the Commission would have the opportunity to rule on whatever that affirmative action might be.

It could be that they simply not pick that dispute and act and file as an excepted local exchange carrier under the statutes as amended and under the new rules, in which case there would never be a controversy -- there would be no reason to issue a ruling one way or another as to whether they are -- those

1 entities are or are not public utilities.

CHAIRMAN IGNATIUS: And, that doesn't trouble you as another provider who's, you know, at times working hand-in-hand and at times in competition with those entities. To say, "we're not sure what they are. They're sort of like a public utility, but maybe they're not, or maybe they are connected to a public utility, though, another business model might mean that they aren't." And, that sense of uncertainty about what their status is does not --

MR. McHUGH: Does not trouble me in the slightest. If I have a concern that Comcast won't voluntarily address, and we have a difference of opinion on either a statute or a rule, I'll bring it to you, and it will be dealt with at that time. So, to answer your question directly is "no, it does not trouble me."

CHAIRMAN IGNATIUS: Other questions?

MS. ROSS: Good afternoon.

MR. McHUGH: Ms. Ross.

MS. ROSS: In your letter, you didn't object to Questions 1 and 2, which had, as we framed them in the order of notice, which had to do with "whether or not the cable voice service falls within the statutory definitions?" And "what regulation, if any, is still

appropriate?" So, I'm assuming that you think it is
proper for the Commission to address those things in its
order in this docket?

MR. McHUGH: I would stand by my proposed order, as I've read it to you.

MS. ROSS: Well, that's giving us a result. But, in order to get there, would you acknowledge that we might have to answer some of those questions?

Because, if the service isn't covered by Senate Bill 48, then that's the end of the analysis. There is no effect, correct?

MR. McHUGH: I would say that's correct. I didn't address, really, any of the questions. But I will also tell you that I did not go back and review the record in DT 09-044 to see exactly how the evidence developed in connection with the service provided by Comcast at that time, or at least as the record was developed. So, I would be guessing, if I really tried to answer it more directly.

MS. ROSS: And, again, would you agree that, in order to reach the result that you promote, the Commission would have to determine that its previous findings were legally insignificant and practically meaningless, I mean, we would have to reach that

conclusion, wouldn't we, in order to vacate orders?

MR. McHUGH: No, I would respectfully disagree with that. I think, because of the lapse of time, combined with the enactment of Senate Bill 48, there's really no need to address that question

6 whatsoever.

MS. ROSS: If that were the case, though, there are hundreds of Commission orders that relate to statutes that have been subsequently amended, and the Commission doesn't routinely vacate prior orders any time there's a change in law. So, in order to do that, wouldn't you agree that the Commission would need some legal basis for determining that vacating the order was necessary?

MR. McHUGH: I think the reasoning for vacating the order is necessary is set forth in the Supreme Court cases cited very well by Verizon and AT&T. The issue is moot. And, that's the reason for vacating it. I'm not certainly proposing or asking that every time a law changes, the Commission has to undertake an analysis of prior orders, specifically because that will come up when facts lead to Commission proceedings. So, as statutes get changed, facts will be developed, complaints will be brought forth, and then, to the extent parties

think prior Commission orders are no longer valid or enforceable because of a change in law, that will come to light.

In this case, what you have is an order from the Supreme Court saying "we don't want to take up this issue until you tell us if your orders, you know, need to be vacated or changed, then we'll decide what we want to do at the Supreme Court." And, given the status, I think the best decision is to vacate the orders. That will have no precedential effect whatsoever on future Commission proceedings, in my humble opinion. And, if the carriers, the rural carriers affiliated with NHTA have more specific facts or complaints, they should be free to bring them forward to deal with whoever is providing VoIP service, whether it's just Comcast or Time Warner, or MetroCast, or whoever might be providing VoIP services at the time.

MS. ROSS: All right. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN IGNATIUS: Commissioner Scott.

CMSR. SCOTT: Hello. Good afternoon.

Following pretty much the same line of reasoning and questioning, I think. What I struggle with is, is it seems to be somewhat, from the different testimony, somewhat a tacet agreement that, as we move into the

{DT 12-308} {11-16-12}

rulemaking, that would be an appropriate area for further discussions that maybe more controversy may be there.

Implied in that is, my concern is, if we were to rule the matter as "moot" and vacate the current rules, it seems like we're making a decision that Senate Bill 48 has certain impacts that we may be adjudicating later in rulemaking, let's say.

So, my question is this, is would it not be better, in your opinion, rather than to call it "moot" and vacate, but to effectively say that "the issue is no longer ripe"?

MR. McHUGH: That's the same thing. I think, by vacating the order, and maybe you could add to my two sentences, but to vacate the order and indicate that it shall have no precedential effect on future Commission determinations or the rulemaking process, will not hinder in any way the Commission to develop rules. I mean, one way or another, I'm expecting that, you know, we are going to have disputes amongst carriers and amongst the Staff and perhaps the OCA as to what the rules should be. I can tell you, for example, I don't at all agree with the OCA's position over the effects of Senate Bill 48 in terms of, you know, residential customers.

So, these issues are going to come up.

You're going to have to deal with them at least in the context of revising your administrative rules, and people will go from there. In the meantime, if there is a new complaint brought, by anybody, whether it's over assessments or barriers to entry, you can deal with it at that time, in light of the facts that you'll have before you as applied to the statutes, the telecommunications statutes in New Hampshire, as revised by Senate Bill 48.

That, just taking that one as an example, barriers to market entry, Comcast is here, Metrocast, they're here. So, if a new carrier comes in, then you can deal with it when that new carrier comes in, and somebody perhaps will file a complaint and say "hey you can't let them into my service territory." But that's the way, you know, to me, that's the way it should be handled.

The same with the assessments, I just give you that example. I mean, if Comcast sent a letter and said "we're not paying your assessment", I'm sure folks up here would have an opinion on it and would take action. But, like I said, you know, once I found out about it, there's going to be something brought and I am going to ask you to deal with it.

CHAIRMAN IGNATIUS: But, Mr. McHugh, you

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say "we don't have to worry about barriers to entry as it relates to these parties, because they're already here."

They have already told us this morning that even an informational filing, with name address, phone number, a contact name, would be impermissible, because it has the effect of being a barrier to entry or affecting their ability to operate in the market. So, --

MR. McHUGH: But my understanding was that was a hypothetical that was thrown out. opinion, and just, again, going back, now it's my opinion, but their opinions have no practical effect to what will happen if a carrier comes forward. So that, whether it's Verizon or Comcast that sits here and says "well, that's a barrier to entry", well, you know what, it doesn't matter what they think, it doesn't really matter what I think. What's going to happen is, if a new carrier comes in and claims that "this is a barrier to entry and I'm not filing it", you will deal with it at that time. Or, perhaps, if it's simply paperwork, you know, people are going to take the path of least resistance, file the paperwork, and not worry about the legal significance of "is it a barrier to entry under the law or is it not a barrier to entry under the law?"

CHAIRMAN IGNATIUS: But my concern is

not even the new players, but the current players. If the answer is we -- any effort in a regulatory requirement, whether it's developed through rulemaking or order, that says "we need to know who you are and how to get in touch with you" has gone too far under Senate Bill 48, which is what I took the answers from Comcast and Verizon to be, then, to say "let's just vacate the orders and begin again in the rulemaking", we've already teed up the first question, the first moment of the rulemaking, is companies that have said "you can't even ask us to give us our name."

MR. McHUGH: Well, they can --

CHAIRMAN IGNATIUS: So, why is that an efficient process, to throw everything out, know that tomorrow we sit down in something we call a "rulemaking" and have exactly the same issue and begin over again?

MR. McHUGH: Well, first, you're affecting, one way or the other, rights of companies who didn't participate in Docket DT 09-044. That's number one. Number two, that issue has been squarely -- has been squarely faced in the rulemaking docket, because NHTA, FairPoint, we proposed rules. And, I have not heard from any party that, except Verizon over one -- I take that back. I haven't heard from any party, other than Verizon

over one rule that they disagreed with, but nobody's taken the position in that docket yet that the administrative forms that we at NHTA proposed for ELECs is somehow a violation of law, not heard from anybody that's overly burdensome. Maybe I will, perhaps they didn't focus on it. But that issue is right in front of you. I set out all kind of rules and forms, a lot of which were struck, but still have administrative requirements for all ELECs. And, you're going to have notice of who to call in an emergency, and what their number is, and where they're located. You know, that's —

CHAIRMAN IGNATIUS: I'll give those companies a chance to respond at the end of this, because it may be that I misunderstood or they misunderstood my question, and I haven't seen any of those rulemaking materials you're talking about yet. But I certainly don't want to -- I think we've got arguments of efficiency on both sides. We don't want to force appeals of issues that are based on laws that are no longer in effect. We also don't want to have the need, and maybe we do not, I'm not sure, but I certainly wouldn't want to set up a situation where we have to be begin anew, if it's something that is still validly whole coming out of the prior proceeding. And, that's, obviously, what we have to resolve here.

Other questions? Yes, Commissioner Harrington.

CMSR. HARRINGTON: Just kind of getting back on this, following up on it a little bit. You're saying, on Page 5 of the AT&T/Verizon, you agreed with their paragraph that says "Because SB 48 establishes that the Commission cannot regulate fixed VoIP providers, this preliminary finding becomes academic", which is a finding that the providers of cable VoIP services are public utilities under New Hampshire law. Are you saying then that they're not public utilities under New Hampshire law?

MR. McHUGH: No. But I am saying, consistent with what I think their positions have been, at least as I understood it today, is that that is not a determination you need to make in this docket.

CMSR. HARRINGTON: Okay. Not in this docket, but is it a determination that needs to be made sometime?

MR. McHUGH: No, not unless they challenge the rules that say they're, you know, they're going to be treated as public utilities, and they have administrative requirements and other requirements, both under the law and the rules. If they challenge it, you'll have to decide it. If they don't challenge it, you know,

I don't think you can presume people are going to violate 1 2 the law. You presume they're going to honor the law. And, then, if situations come to your attention or 3 4 complaints are filed alleging that they are not following 5 the law, you deal with it then. 6 CMSR. HARRINGTON: And, if we did as you 7 requested, and, by the way, I kind of like this idea of 8 the people writing their own orders here, it will save a 9 lot of time. And, if we can get everybody to write one, 10 we'll pick the best one. And, spend less time watching --11 more time eating and watching football over Thanksgiving 12 Weekend that way. 13 If we followed your advice and vacated 14 the orders and closed the dockets, then what is in effect 15 during the time between the vacating of those orders and 16 the time the new rules go through the whole process and 17 they actually get signed and approved? 18 MR. McHUGH: Well, the statutes are in 19 effect, and people have to comply with the statutes. 20 then, the effort has to turn to, for lack of a better 21 phrase, squaring regulations into the same peg as the 22 statutes. 23 CMSR. HARRINGTON: And, you see no

problem with, as we've seen here today, there's multiple

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opinions on what the statutes that are in effect actually 1 2 imply and would be required to comply with? Doesn't that 3 set a kind of confusing thing, if we have one group of 4 people saying "this applies" and another group saying 5 "this doesn't apply", and so forth? 6 MR. McHUGH: No, I'm not concerned at 7 all by that. 8 CMSR. HARRINGTON: Okay. 9 MR. McHUGH: I mean, we are definitely 10 in competition, there's no doubt about it. And, if 11 somebody has a problem, between the staff and all of the 12 carriers here, you're going to hear about it. And, that's just, to me, maybe it's too simplistic, I don't know, but 13 14 that's the way it works. And, I'm certainly -- you know, 15 I'm capable of doing that, as are others within FairPoint. CMSR. HARRINGTON: 16 Okay. That's all my 17 questions. Thank you.

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CHAIRMAN IGNATIUS: I'm concerned that we're still in sort of a circular situation, where you said, you know, "you shouldn't assume that people are going to violate the law." Agreed. But, if we don't even know the regulatory definition of a "provider", then how do we know what -- what are we testing it against to say "are they in compliance with the law or not?" I'm not as

comfortable with this "it's what it is, and we'll work it 1 out if it turns out to be a problem" as you are. 2 3 MR. McHUGH: I'm not sure if I understand the question, but let me try and answer it, and 4 then you can come back and whack it and we'll do it again. 5 6 But, you know, there is no test, in my 7 opinion, to undertake, until you have some complaint, whether it's raised by your staff or others, there is 8 9 nothing to test. Until somebody takes either affirmative 10 action or an affirmative omission that requires the Commission to get involved, whether it's an investigation 11 12 or an informal inquiry as to "why didn't you do this?" 13 CHAIRMAN IGNATIUS: Well, but, just the basic notion "are you a public utility or not?" 14 15 MR. McHUGH: I guess --16 CHAIRMAN IGNATIUS: I have -- maybe I'm 17 too simplistic in my approach to my job. I think I've got 18 a list of people who I know are within my jurisdiction, and those that are not. And, occasionally, you get 19 20 behavior by someone that looks like it should have been on 21 one side of the line and not on the other and we take it 22 But, to go in from the beginning saying "We know you're operating. And, we're just going to leave that 23 24 We're not going to define what you are, and uncertain.

wait and see if anyone's bothered by it." Seems like a strange approach.

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MR. McHUGH: Entities are registered in your records as a competitive local exchange carrier, an incumbent local exchange carrier, an IXC, I don't know that anyone is complaining about how they registered specifically, vis-a-vis what services they're offering. read it quite a while ago, but the overall complaint was very broad. And that, you know, "Comcast", you know, whatever the right adjective is, but "is not subject to regulations, and they should be. " Well, that world got, in my opinion, turned upside-down by Senate Bill 48. you have, for example, in Senate Bill 48, a requirement that says "all excepted local exchange carriers basically have to be treated equally", except for a couple of exceptions, most of which, quite frankly, apply to FairPoint, wholesale obligations, certain broadband obligations, I don't have the list, but that's it.

So, I don't know why there's a need, or perhaps maybe I don't understand why, Commissioner Ignatius, you are so uncomfortable with the proposition that you need to go further than how they register.

CHAIRMAN IGNATIUS: Well, because certain entities are registered, but we have a VoIP

provider that says "it's not the ELEC", it works with the ELEC, but it's not the ELEC. It says, "we don't have to really decide if they're a public utility or not, just don't worry about it." And, that's the part that I don't — I have trouble with. It's not all the regulated ones that are already registered. It's this VoIP provider that our prior orders would have said "you're a public utility, and you've got to follow whatever degree of regulation is appropriate", that's going to look like how we treat CLECs. If we vacate the orders, then we have the VoIP provider in this no man's lands, and we just leave it and see if somebody comes up and complains?

MR. McHUGH: Well, it's probably in no man's land for an extended period of time. Now, the question is, is there a great deal of harm that will come about by leaving it for some unspecified, but what I would propose is a relatively short period of time in this continued no man's land, versus taking a case that was decided on facts years ago, and trying to make it square somehow into a new legislative mandate of which, you know, there's no rules yet, really. Well, maybe not "no rules", but which require a lot of changes to your administrative rules.

So, it's not as though I'm saying, you

know, "look the other way, and, you know, ten years from now it's an issue, eh, we'll come back." I mean, it's So, where is the right arena, the right docket, whatever the right phrase is, but where is the correct avenue to make these determinations, based on how I read the Supreme Court decisions as cited by Verizon/AT&T. think the law, the regs, suggest strongly that you vacate the orders without prejudice. And, you know, maybe one avenue is that people won't like, you're going to issue a ruling that's going to go to the Supreme Court, and then they're going to decide what to do. But that's not -- you know, I'm not here to advocate your job, you're here to try and make the right decision. And, maybe one way or the other, no matter what you do, it's going up to the Supreme Court. I'm certainly concerned, and I think I've expressed it, that I view a lot of what you potentially could rule on, especially based on questions, that they are more akin to rules, I didn't have an ability to really influence the outcome of DT 09-044, that's because I, you know, intentionally made a decision, or others at FairPoint, depending on when I joined, but made the discussion that "well, that doesn't affect our company's interest." But, certainly, it didn't affect, in my opinion, FairPoint's interests too much to get into the

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       docket, or our interests, I should say, didn't dictate to
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       me that I somehow need to get into that docket, until I
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       read your order, which followed the Supreme Court's, your
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       order of notice. And, I thought, "well, that's a
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       problem." Because, you know, that's just the way I view
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       it, and I understand people disagree, but that's the way I
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       deal with it.
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                         CHAIRMAN IGNATIUS: All right.
                                                          Thank
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       you. Any other questions?
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                         (No verbal response)
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                         CHAIRMAN IGNATIUS: All right.
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       you.
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                         MR. McHUGH:
                                      Thank you.
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                         CHAIRMAN IGNATIUS: I think we may have
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       a couple of follow-up questions back to Comcast or Verizon
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       for things that have come up, and probably no very good
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       order. But I guess the one we most recently were talking
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       about was the question of regulatory reach that we can
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       develop in the rulemaking, and give you an opportunity,
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       Mr. Platzer or Mr. Moore. If I misunderstood your
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       responses or if you were responding to a question that was
       different than what I was getting at, I'd like to hear it,
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       because it sounds a little different, what I took from
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       your answer about any degree of regulatory filing,
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registration, you know, informational submissions would be impermissible under 48, sounds different from what Mr. McHugh's understanding was. So, do you have anything you want to help understand, either confirm or clarify?

MR. PLATZER: Well, certainly, we believe that the appropriate venue to be addressing questions of that sort is not this docket. But, if there's -- if the Commission wants to address those types of questions as part of a rulemaking, and then we can make an assessment as to whether there are any rules that the Commission there under the rulemaking decides to apply to us that we want to challenge, if there are things we want to challenge, either under state law or as federally preempted. And, then, in the event we disagree with something that the Commission does in the context of that rulemaking, we'll have a live disagreement that we can take up to the court and a challenge that wouldn't be moot.

Certainly, our position here is that this particular docket is a very -- it's a very bad venue for adjudicating those kinds of questions, because we don't seem to have any remaining disagreement now about whether or not we are complying with what's -- sort of what's left over in the savings clause. But, if the

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Commission wants to further investigate or give further thoughts to sort of what regulations are still in place and what the -- sort of the regulations might look like in light of SB 48.

I think that vacating the orders in 09-044, and then taking them up somewhere where we can make an assessment as to whether or not we want to challenge them, is the better way to go about it. And, I know, Chairman Ignatius, you expressed concern about this idea of sort of leaving -- leaving it unresolved until that rulemaking what the regulatory status of VoIP providers in the state is, whether they're public utilities or not. And, I think it sort of bears mentioning there that, and it's that -- that no man's land certainly existed for several years before the Commission resolved the question in 09-044, the way it did with those orders. And, VoIP providers aren't subject to state public utility regulation at all in I believe about 20 states or so. And, the sky has not fallen down in those places. So, the idea that there might be some sort of academic regulatory uncertainty before the Commission takes this up in a rulemaking, doesn't strike us as something that's particularly problematic.

And, also, I believe, as we argued in

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our brief as well, the statutory authority under which the Commission initiated the docket to begin with presupposes that there's some past act or conduct or proposal that would put Comcast out of compliance with the Commission's regulations. So, it mirrors or — while I certainly understand the desire to sort of have everything cleanly categorized under the law, the Commission's own authorizing statutes for the investigation presupposes that there are some actual disagreement or some actual accusation that we in somehow acted out of compliance with the law, and there's no such accusation before the Commission now.
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CHAIRMAN IGNATIUS: I don't -- I am not sure I can agree with that. I don't know that there is or isn't, and we're certainly not -- we haven't been asked to do that from the Supreme Court.

Mr. Moore, any other thing you'd like to add on that issue?

MR. MOORE: Just a small point. That, even in a rulemaking, you wouldn't have to get to this issue about whether VoIP is a public utility or not. You would make the rules that you deemed fit to make. You may, for example, have a rule that says "all telecommunication providers must register with the

Commission." Well, Verizon, we've already registered; 1 2 we're fine. So, there may not be any dispute or any 3 reason to look at that issue, until and unless some carrier comes into the state and says, "well, we don't 4 5 have to register, because we're a purely VoIP provider." 6 And, then, the issue comes to you, someone brings a 7 complaint that says "you should make these folks 8 register." And, even if all those things come to pass, 9 the first issue you would look at is "well, what does the 10 statute say?" You might never even reach the question 11 even then about whether they're a public utility, because 12 you might say "The statute says, a public utility or not, there's an exception for VoIP providers, and I decide 13 14 whether I'm allowed to regulate a VoIP provider." 15 And, the Legislature chose not to change 16 the definition of "public utility". The Legislature went 17 about this in a different way. So, you may have to do a 18 functional analysis and look at the statute first. So, it 19 may not come up. Or, and if it does come up, then at 20 least the Commission will have the benefit of having a 21 particular fact situation in front of you. For example, 22 you may say "is this person even providing VoIP?" Like 23 question one that you've lined up here. The first one may

be "This service that you're offering doesn't even look

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like VoIP. So, you need to register."

So, whether Comcast is a public utility is not a live issue now, and it may never come up. It might come up in the context of somebody else. It might come up in the context of somebody else on a particular aspect of regulation. But it's easier for the Commission to make the proper decision when it has the actual facts in front of it.

CHAIRMAN IGNATIUS: Can I get a clarification from both Comcast and Verizon on how you define "broadband"? Because I think we've got some different interpretations, and they relate to how we interpret the statute. It isn't just out of curiosity about how you define "broadband". But it's as to the relationship between the statute's definitions of "VoIP" and "IP-enabled services" and the services that are being offered in this docket.

So, when you look at, Mr. Platzer, when you look at the services of CDV VoIP -- or, CDV, and you put it in the category of calling it "VoIP", as opposed to "IP-enabled", what is the -- when you referred to broadband as part of that service, how are you defining broadband there?

MR. PLATZER: If I could just confer for

1 a moment?
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CHAIRMAN IGNATIUS: That's fine.

(Atty. Platzer conferring with Atty.

Geiger and Atty. Parker.)

MR. PLATZER: I don't know if we sort of

6 have an official definition of the term "broadband" here.

7 But, if I could help a little bit with where I think your

8 concern is, the reason that we think that we fall under

9 the "VoIP" definition, rather than the "IP-enabled

10 | service" definition, is not about the broadband

11 requirement in 362:7, I(d)(2), but rather the real-time

12 | two-way voice communications element of (d)(1). And, the

13 | reason that we had taken the position that our VoIP

14 | service falls under the "VoIP service" rather than

15 "IP-enabled service" definition is that the VoIP calling

16 | features enable two-way simultaneous voice calling,

17 whereas, the other -- the other features of the same

18 | communications suite, like the ones that you access over

19 | your handheld device or through your Internet connection,

20 | those don't have simultaneous two-way voice calling as the

21 | element, which is the why we have the ancillary parts of

22 | the service in the "IP-enabled services" category.

23 | Certainly, under federal -- federal law

24 | also incorporates the broadband connection requirement as

part of the federal definition of an interconnected VoIP provider. And, we don't believe that there's any controversy that we -- that our VoIP service falls under the federal definition, we certainly are subject to all of the federal regulations that go along with being an interconnected VoIP provider under federal law, such as federal USF and number porting and E911 and all of those requirements. So, you know, we hadn't viewed that as a subject that was in dispute here today.

CHAIRMAN IGNATIUS: Does your service -your broadband connection necessarily connect to the
internet?

MR. PLATZER: Not necessarily, no. A customer -- yes, certainly, the private IP network is used for the calling features itself. Almost all customers who have the CDV service that runs over the Comcast cable also subscribe to broadband, high-speed broadband Internet service, which connects to the public Internet. But it's not a requirement that a customer subscribe to the Internet service in order to purchase the CDV service. And, the CDV service doesn't -- you see, well, the voice calling features in the CDV service do not utilize the public Internet, although a lot of the other communications features of the CDV service, like the ones

1 that go over your handheld device or through like the 2 Web-based portal, those do use the public Internet. 3 CHAIRMAN IGNATIUS: Mr. Moore, anything 4 that you would want to add to or note on that issue? 5 MR. MOORE: Just that the statute 6 doesn't require an internet connection. The definition of 7 "VoIP" requires broadband, but not -- doesn't say anything 8 about "connected to the Internet". And, I think, under 9 federal law, there's argument that Internet -- the word 10 "Internet" can include private data transfer systems, not necessarily just the public Internet. But you don't need 11 12 to get into that. Because all you need here just to find 13 that something is a VoIP service on that element is that 14 it includes broadband. And, I think, under the federal 15 level, it distinguishes that from other data transfer by 16 speed. So, you just need to look at whether the speed of 17 the transfer is appropriate. 18 CHAIRMAN IGNATIUS: So, you would say 19 that the use of broadband in that (d)(2) is a speed 20 definition only? 21 MR. MOORE: Well, yes. Data transfer at 22 a certain -- faster than 760 kilobits a second, I think is 23 the limit, or at least somewhere around there. I believe,

at the top of Page 3, in our brief, we had a little

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parenthetical clause there, where we referred to, the first full paragraph, we referred to just a "broadband connection", and we said "namely, high-speed packetized IP transport from the subscriber's location." So, it's really data transfer past a certain speed. And, I also think that, Harry can correct me if I'm wrong, I think the Rurals agree that Comcast service, in this case, qualifies as VoIP under the statute.

CHAIRMAN IGNATIUS: I know that was Mr. Malone's statement before.

So, Mr. Platzer, I know you had said that, in your view, the definitions of "IP-enabled" and "VoIP" in our statute are "mutually exclusive", am I saying that right?

MR. PLATZER: Yes.

CHAIRMAN IGNATIUS: And, that you fit within VoIP, and therefore not within IP-enabled. If it weren't for a requirement that you have to be one or the other and can't be both, would you also consider yourself to meet the definition of "IP-enabled"?

MR. PLATZER: If it weren't for the last clause of Subpart (e), which says that you can't -- it says you can't be IP-enabled if you're VoIP, then, yes, we do otherwise fall within the definition of "IP-enabled".

And, certainly, as we said, a lot of the features of the service do fall within the "IP-enabled" definition.

I wanted to ask you, Mr. Platzer, is you had said that, both in your brief and this morning, that it was necessary to appeal certain findings of the prior orders. Can you explain again which findings that are there that you think are critical for you to have to appeal?

MR. PLATZER: By far, the most important one to us, and which really is sort of principally driving our need to appeal those orders, are the determinations under federal law. And, especially, in the first of the three orders, the determination that "Comcast CDV service is a telecommunications service for federal purposes, rather than an information service for federal purposes." So far that the weight of the federal authority on that point goes in the other direction. And, due to at least the risk of exposing ourselves to arguments about collateral estoppel in other cases, other states, other venues, we believe it's necessary for us to appeal that determination to the Supreme Court.

We also believe that, as a matter of prudence, the fact that that finding is now so clearly unnecessary to the Commission's orders, should, at a bare

minimum, that that should be vacated, even if the Commission wants to leave in place its holdings under state law.

And, then also, in addition, the categorization. There's the federal law analysis about the preemption under federal law that flows from that that we believe we need to appeal.

To a lesser extent, we also had similar concerns about the state law holdings on the merits that CDV service is a public utility. Again, because of the possible precedential or collateral estoppel effects in future proceedings in the state, and, in the event that we are forced to appeal the orders here, we would also see a need to challenge that determination on the merits. But I will be lying to you if I claim that we view that issue as critical as the federal analysis, which is really the principal driver here.

CHAIRMAN IGNATIUS: I appreciate the candor. I guess that what I'm not quite following is, if you said today you're not -- it's not even really that important to determine if you're a public utility or not, and haven't really wanted to be pinned down on whether you consider yourself a public utility or not, then why -- how does that square with the statement that one of things you

need to appeal is the determination of being a public utility? It sounds like you do believe you are not a public utility, and would want to convince the Supreme Court of that?

MR. PLATZER: We don't believe that it ought to matter whether or not we're a public utility under the way that we read Senate Bill 48. We would, for instance, we would hope that the Commission shares our views of what Senate Bill 48 means and what it does to the significance of a public utility holding. But, in the event the Commission were to take a more expansive view of the types of regulatory requirements that attach onto a "public utility" designation, we would want to reserve our rights to challenge the determination that we're a public utility to begin with.

Certainly, in the event the Commission were to share our view that Senate Bill 48 effectively removes most of the significance of that determination, it might ultimately matter less as a practical matter. And, certainly, there's also the reality that in no other state where we currently operate is our VoIP carrier regulated as a public utility. And, so, the unique nature of that holding, I mean, concern about future precedential effects, in the event that the Commission were to disagree

1 with us about what we think Senate Bill 48 does, that 2 would be -- we would ask to make the appeal of this part. 3 CHAIRMAN IGNATIUS: Follow-up question? 4 Commissioner Harrington. 5 CMSR. HARRINGTON: Yes. I wanted to just follow up on this issue of public utility. Going 6 7 back to what Ms. Chamberlin, from the OCA's Office said, 8 she said that, basically, "SB 48 changed the consequences 9 of being classified as a public utility, but did not really change the threshold for determining that fact." 10 11 Do you agree with that or not? 12 MR. PLATZER: I certainly agree with the first part of that, which is that "SB 48 changed the 13 14 consequences of being a public utility". Don't believe 15 it's necessary for the Commission to answer the second 16 question, which is "whether or not Senate Bill 48 changed 17 what it means to be a public utility?" I think you can 18 make reasonable arguments under the statute either way. 19 But we don't think it's necessary to make that decision

here, because that only in the event that the consequences of being a public utility were to present a real case or controversy would it become necessary to resolve that

23 question.

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CMSR. HARRINGTON: But would you agree

that Senate Bill 48 that defines the "Voice over Internet Protocol" and the "IP-enabled service", and then has the paragraph that's been much quoted here about exempt -- "Except as set forth in Paragraph III, notwithstanding any other provision of the law to the contrary", and I won't read the whole thing, that's in the section of the law called "362:7 Telephone Utilities", which is under the general statute of 362, which deals with public utilities' "Definition of Terms". So, if you're not a public utility, then why would all this information that you're saying applies specifically to you, and the exemption of things apply in the statute that has to deal with telephone utilities?

MR. PLATZER: Well, Commissioner, that same section of the statute also talks about "IP-enabled services".

CMSR. HARRINGTON: Uh-huh.

MR. PLATZER: Things like your broadband/Internet connection or the applications that you use on your -- applications you use on your mobile phone. It's inconceivable that the Legislature intended to make IP-enabled services into public utilities or telephone utilities under the statute simply because that's the statutory subsection in which it put the definition. So,

we don't believe that it would be appropriate to read the mere placement of the "VoIP services" definition in the statute, as amended by Senate Bill 48, as indicating anything about the Legislature's intent to designate VoIP services as a public utility. That argument, in our view, would prove to much.

CMSR. HARRINGTON: Okay.

 $$\operatorname{MR.\ PLATZER}$:$$ Because it would mean the same thing for IP-enabled services.

CMSR. HARRINGTON: And, going forward on that same section then, this is Section III, with "The prohibitions of paragraph II shall not be construed to". And, then, in (e) there's a whole list of statutes that would say it "Affects or limit the application or enforcement of", and I'm not going to read them all, you can do that.

So, you're saying, or I guess I'm trying to figure out what your position is, is the applicability of these two, as you've determined yourself, as a VoIP provider. So, it would appear that these only -- would only apply to a VoIP provider if the VoIP provider isn't indeed classified as a "public utility". Would you agree with that or not?

MR. PLATZER: No, we don't. You have to

look sort of statute by statute at the criteria, in each statutory provision, as to what triggers the application of the statute. And, there are some instances where a "public utility" designation is relevant to these provisions that are in III. For instance, the Dig Safe regulations or the herbicide use ones, you have to be a public utility first in order for these regulations about where — how to dig safe and whether or not to use herbicide to apply.

But, other provisions, such as being an attaching entity onto a pole or prohibitions against slamming, they don't apply to public utilities as such, they have different sets of criteria for what kinds of entities are covered in the first instance. So, some of these provisions in the savings clause apply to public utilities, others apply based on independent criteria such that public utility status doesn't matter. And, we tried to break those out in our brief, which fell into which category.

But the mere fact that those -- that the savings clause includes both kinds of statutes, both the kinds that apply to public utilities and the kinds where it doesn't matter whether or not you're a public utility for the statute to apply, the fact that they are

commingled in the savings clause in that way is a further counsel against the view that VoIP providers are automatically public utilities just because of the particular section of the statute that the definition is placed into.

CMSR. HARRINGTON: Well, then, let's look at the ones that specifically do require or do apply only to public utilities, like the herbicide one, for example. So, would you say then, as not a public utility, that the provisions of, and I'm not sure which law it is, but it's one of those on there, it calls for notification to people in the use of herbicides, and given the option to use cutting of the foliage rather than the herbicide, it simply doesn't apply, and that your company could go out and do that without implementing that law -- or, following that law?

MR. PLATZER: We think it doesn't apply to us for an entirely different reason, having nothing to do with the "public utility" designation, which is that it's our cable affiliates who actually -- who actually own the cable and the conduit. So -- and that the law clearly does apply to them, insofar as it applies to cable providers. So, since we don't actually -- our VoIP provider doesn't actually own or operate physical

facilities that would be necessary to trigger those types of requirements, that it doesn't apply. But the reason it doesn't apply has nothing to do with the categorization of the service.

CMSR. HARRINGTON: Well, let me see if I can maybe rephrase that. You're saying "the law would apply if you were to perform those activities, but, since you don't perform those activities, it really doesn't make any difference what the law states"?

MR. PLATZER: That's perhaps going a little bit farther than I would have gone.

CMSR. HARRINGTON: Okav.

MR. PLATZER: Which is that, because the law doesn't apply to us, because we don't own those facilities, the Commission has no need to reach the question of whether the law would apply to us in a hypothetical world where our VoIP provider owned cables and conduits.

CMSR. HARRINGTON: Well, I guess I'm asking for that question on that hypothetical world then. If you were not a public utility, then, if you were to engage in those activities, such as specified in the thing on herbicide or pole attachments or Dig Safe, those laws would not apply to you, because you're not a public

1 utility? 2 MR. PLATZER: Then, the Commission -- if 3 that hypothetical situation were to arise, then the Commission would have before it sort of an actual live 4 5 question about where it would actually matter for our 6 service whether or not we are categorized as a "public 7 utility" or not. And, certainly, it's not this case 8 today. In the event that case were to come up, I think 9 Comcast's position would be the same one we took in DT 09-044, which is that "we are not a public utility under 10 11 the statute." But we don't believe that the Commission 12 needs to resolve that question on the merits here today. 13 So, for the time CMSR. HARRINGTON: being, until actually an actual incident comes up or it's 14 15 addressed in the rules or something, your position is that 16 you should -- the orders should be vacated, and the 17 question as to whether you're a public utility or not just 18 should not be addressed and not decided one way or the 19 other? 20 MR. PLATZER: That's correct. 21 CMSR. HARRINGTON: All right. Thank 22 you. 23 CHAIRMAN IGNATIUS: Anything further? 24 (No verbal response)

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                         CHAIRMAN IGNATIUS: If not, then thank
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       you, everyone, for your attention and sticking with us
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       through a lot of questions as we've tried to sort out what
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       I find to be a very complex statute. Mr. McHugh, yes?
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                         MR. McHUGH: My apologies, Chair
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       Ignatius. I do want to follow up, though, on that last
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       point, because it sort of gets to the heart of my concern,
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       the dialogue between Commissioner Harrington and Comcast's
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       counsel. We can't, in this, through this docket, solve
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       for every possible hypothetical. So, -- because you're
       not also considering what other statutes might apply.
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      And, let me give what I --
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                         CHAIRMAN IGNATIUS: We understand your
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       point. I don't know if you need to go further.
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                         MR. McHUGH: We're good. Thank you.
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                         CHAIRMAN IGNATIUS: -- you've made that
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       clear that this isn't a generic rulemaking.
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                         MR. McHUGH:
                                      Thank you.
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                         CHAIRMAN IGNATIUS: All right. Then,
       it's almost 1:30. Thank you, everyone, for a -- working
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      hard to go through it this morning. Mr. Platzer?
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                         MR. PLATZER: Yes. Would the Commission
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       find it helpful for the parties to submit any kind of post
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1	hearing brief, post hearing briefing on these issues?
2	And, we're certainly prepared to, if the Commission would
3	like us to.
4	CHAIRMAN IGNATIUS: Thank you. We had
5	talked earlier. We didn't think we needed to have that
6	done. Any change in that? No. I think we've got enough
7	to read and we just have to sort it through. So, thank
8	you.
9	We stand adjourned. We will take it
10	under advisement.
11	(Whereupon the hearing was adjourned
12	at 1:26 p.m.)
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